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@ -170,6 +170,7 @@ electronic commerce and payment, financial privacy, proof of work, zero knowledg |
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\newcommand{\Zcash}{\termbf{Zcash}} |
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\newcommand{\Zerocash}{\termbf{Zerocash}} |
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\newcommand{\Bitcoin}{\termbf{Bitcoin}} |
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\newcommand{\CryptoNote}{\termbf{CryptoNote}} |
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\newcommand{\ZEC}{\termbf{ZEC}} |
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\newcommand{\zatoshi}{\term{zatoshi}} |
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@ -895,7 +896,7 @@ view the set of possibilities for a given \note input to a \transaction |
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---its \noteTraceabilitySet--- includes \emph{all} previous notes that the |
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adversary does not control or know to have been spent. This contrasts with |
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other proposals for private payment systems, such as CoinJoin \cite{Bitcoin-CoinJoin} |
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or CryptoNote \cite{vanS2014}, that are based on mixing of a limited number of |
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or \CryptoNote \cite{vanS2014}, that are based on mixing of a limited number of |
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transactions and that therefore have smaller \noteTraceabilitySets. |
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The \nullifiers are necessary to prevent double-spending: each note only has |
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@ -4267,7 +4268,7 @@ The errors in the proof of Ledger Indistinguishability mentioned in |
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relating to the in-band secret distribution. |
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\item Add various citations: the ``Fixing Vulnerabilities in the Zcash |
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Protocol'' and ``Why Equihash?'' blog posts, several crypto papers |
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for security definitions, the \Bitcoin whitepaper, the CryptoNote |
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for security definitions, the \Bitcoin whitepaper, the \CryptoNote |
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whitepaper, and several references to \Bitcoin documentation. |
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\item Reference the extended version of the \Zerocash paper rather than the |
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Oakland proceedings version. |
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