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-# HushDEX
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+# HushDEX
+
+HushDEX forked from the Subatomic Decentralized App (dapp) and we focus purely
+on privacy coin swaps, and specifically, shielded swaps between Zcash Protocol
+coins. These are called z-swaps.
+
+## Z-swap example
+
+Alice has 1 ZEC and wants to trade it for 5 HUSH, since she hears HushChat is
+pretty awesome and ZEC just goes down in price, always. We represent this in
+a diagram like this
+
+    Alice (ZEC) <> Bob (HUSH)
+
+HushDEX is only concerns with Sapling shielded addresses (zaddrs) which start
+with `zs1`. Even though ZEC supports Sprout addresses (which start with `zc`),
+they cannot be used on HushDEX. Sprout is unsupported on HushDEX.
+
+So Alice must make sure her ZEC is in a Sapling zaddr, and then she can use
+HushDEX on her computer, to z-swap with Bob, in a decentralized way, with
+no centralized service. The system is not completely trustless, users must
+trust the developers and miners on the relevant chains to not do nefarious
+things. There is no central authority to decide who gets to do what, it's
+peer-to-peer like BitTorrent or Tor.
+
+## Privacy Features of Z-Swaps
+
+  * No KYC
+    * We will not feed the identity theft industry any more free data
+  * No IP address limiting
+    * It is trivial to pay for an IP address from any country in the world
+  * Alice's address never appears in public data
+  * Bob's address never appears in public data
+  * Consequently, Alice and Bob's address cannot be searched for on an explorer
+  * Since you can't see the address of any transaction, you cannot infer if
+    the same address appears as sender or receiver in many transactions.
+  * The amount of the transaction, how much ZEC and how much HUSH, is unknown
+    * It could be pennies or millions
+  * The exchange rate of the transaction never appears on the blockchain
+    * The exchange rate will be leaked to the network p2p layer, but it is never
+      recorded in blockchain history. If you are not there to record it, it is gone.
+    * Realistically, it's simple to run a malicious node which records all exchange rates
+      and so we assume an adversary does this
+    * Since the exchange rate of ZEC/HUSH is already public data, this is not considered valuable
+      information leakage. We are leaking the differential of CEX ZEC/HUSH exchange ratio to
+      this DEX's ratio.
+    * Adversaries watching all possible public data can infer exchange ratios but no amounts
+      or addresses, which is considered a massive blow against blockchain analysis.
+