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@ -80,14 +80,15 @@ regression rather than improvement. |
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## ZIP213 Hurts The Entire Shieded Pool |
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Not only does using this "feature/bug" from ECC hurt the individual miner, but it hurts the entire privacy of Zcash mainnet. |
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As a chain analysis company, Shielded Coinbase provide extra metadata to link owners of taddrs and zaddrs together. |
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As a chain analysis company, Shielded Coinbase leaks extra metadata about miners compared to the traditional way of mining. |
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Normally, a miner receives funds to a taddr, *then* send to a zaddr. This is a very privacy-preserving process, as the zaddr |
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NEVER APPEARS PUBLICLY. |
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With ZIP213, a miner PUBLISHES their zaddr (something the Hush community considers extremely bad for privacy) and then proceeds |
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to publicize various transactions that miner finds to that zaddr. It's similar to saying "this is my z2z transaction id and also |
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the amounts that were involved and the address", which basically removes all privacy. |
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to publiish various details in transactions that are mined to the public zaddr. It's similar to saying "this is my z2z transaction id and also |
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the amounts that were involved and the address", which removes all privacy from the transaction, while still being able to say |
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that a shielded address is used. |
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Even if funds are then moved again to another zaddress, chain analysis companies will use this historical data to correlate |
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which miners sold to which exchanges that were then used later on in various transactions. The metadata infects the blockchain |
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