Hush Full Node software. We were censored from Github, this is where all development happens now. https://hush.is
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// Copyright (c) 2009-2013 The Bitcoin Core developers
4 years ago
// Copyright (c) 2019-2020 The Hush developers
// Distributed under the GPLv3 software license, see the accompanying
// file COPYING or https://www.gnu.org/licenses/gpl-3.0.en.html
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
13 years ago
/******************************************************************************
* Copyright © 2014-2019 The SuperNET Developers. *
* *
* See the AUTHORS, DEVELOPER-AGREEMENT and LICENSE files at *
* the top-level directory of this distribution for the individual copyright *
* holder information and the developer policies on copyright and licensing. *
* *
* Unless otherwise agreed in a custom licensing agreement, no part of the *
* SuperNET software, including this file may be copied, modified, propagated *
* or distributed except according to the terms contained in the LICENSE file *
* *
* Removal or modification of this copyright notice is prohibited. *
* *
******************************************************************************/
#include "crypter.h"
#include "script/script.h"
#include "script/standard.h"
#include "streams.h"
#include "util.h"
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
13 years ago
#include <string>
#include <vector>
#include <boost/foreach.hpp>
#include <openssl/aes.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
13 years ago
using namespace libzcash;
bool CCrypter::SetKeyFromPassphrase(const SecureString& strKeyData, const std::vector<unsigned char>& chSalt, const unsigned int nRounds, const unsigned int nDerivationMethod)
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
13 years ago
{
if (nRounds < 1 || chSalt.size() != WALLET_CRYPTO_SALT_SIZE)
return false;
int i = 0;
if (nDerivationMethod == 0)
i = EVP_BytesToKey(EVP_aes_256_cbc(), EVP_sha512(), &chSalt[0],
(unsigned char *)&strKeyData[0], strKeyData.size(), nRounds, chKey, chIV);
if (i != (int)WALLET_CRYPTO_KEY_SIZE)
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
13 years ago
{
memory_cleanse(chKey, sizeof(chKey));
memory_cleanse(chIV, sizeof(chIV));
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
13 years ago
return false;
}
fKeySet = true;
return true;
}
bool CCrypter::SetKey(const CKeyingMaterial& chNewKey, const std::vector<unsigned char>& chNewIV)
{
if (chNewKey.size() != WALLET_CRYPTO_KEY_SIZE || chNewIV.size() != WALLET_CRYPTO_KEY_SIZE)
return false;
memcpy(&chKey[0], &chNewKey[0], sizeof chKey);
memcpy(&chIV[0], &chNewIV[0], sizeof chIV);
fKeySet = true;
return true;
}
bool CCrypter::Encrypt(const CKeyingMaterial& vchPlaintext, std::vector<unsigned char> &vchCiphertext)
{
if (!fKeySet)
return false;
// max ciphertext len for a n bytes of plaintext is
// n + AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1 bytes
int nLen = vchPlaintext.size();
int nCLen = nLen + AES_BLOCK_SIZE, nFLen = 0;
vchCiphertext = std::vector<unsigned char> (nCLen);
bool fOk = true;
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
13 years ago
EVP_CIPHER_CTX* ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
assert(ctx);
if (fOk) fOk = EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_256_cbc(), NULL, chKey, chIV) != 0;
if (fOk) fOk = EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, &vchCiphertext[0], &nCLen, &vchPlaintext[0], nLen) != 0;
if (fOk) fOk = EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(ctx, (&vchCiphertext[0]) + nCLen, &nFLen) != 0;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
13 years ago
if (!fOk) return false;
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
13 years ago
vchCiphertext.resize(nCLen + nFLen);
return true;
}
bool CCrypter::Decrypt(const std::vector<unsigned char>& vchCiphertext, CKeyingMaterial& vchPlaintext)
{
if (!fKeySet)
return false;
// plaintext will always be equal to or lesser than length of ciphertext
int nLen = vchCiphertext.size();
int nPLen = nLen, nFLen = 0;
vchPlaintext = CKeyingMaterial(nPLen);
bool fOk = true;
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
13 years ago
EVP_CIPHER_CTX* ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
assert(ctx);
if (fOk) fOk = EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_256_cbc(), NULL, chKey, chIV) != 0;
if (fOk) fOk = EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, &vchPlaintext[0], &nPLen, &vchCiphertext[0], nLen) != 0;
if (fOk) fOk = EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(ctx, (&vchPlaintext[0]) + nPLen, &nFLen) != 0;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
13 years ago
if (!fOk) return false;
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
13 years ago
vchPlaintext.resize(nPLen + nFLen);
return true;
}
static bool EncryptSecret(const CKeyingMaterial& vMasterKey, const CKeyingMaterial &vchPlaintext, const uint256& nIV, std::vector<unsigned char> &vchCiphertext)
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
13 years ago
{
CCrypter cKeyCrypter;
std::vector<unsigned char> chIV(WALLET_CRYPTO_KEY_SIZE);
memcpy(&chIV[0], &nIV, WALLET_CRYPTO_KEY_SIZE);
6 years ago
if (!cKeyCrypter.SetKey(vMasterKey, chIV))
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
13 years ago
return false;
return cKeyCrypter.Encrypt(*((const CKeyingMaterial*)&vchPlaintext), vchCiphertext);
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
13 years ago
}
static bool DecryptSecret(const CKeyingMaterial& vMasterKey, const std::vector<unsigned char>& vchCiphertext, const uint256& nIV, CKeyingMaterial& vchPlaintext)
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
13 years ago
{
CCrypter cKeyCrypter;
std::vector<unsigned char> chIV(WALLET_CRYPTO_KEY_SIZE);
memcpy(&chIV[0], &nIV, WALLET_CRYPTO_KEY_SIZE);
6 years ago
if (!cKeyCrypter.SetKey(vMasterKey, chIV))
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
13 years ago
return false;
return cKeyCrypter.Decrypt(vchCiphertext, *((CKeyingMaterial*)&vchPlaintext));
}
static bool DecryptHDSeed(
const CKeyingMaterial& vMasterKey,
const std::vector<unsigned char>& vchCryptedSecret,
const uint256& seedFp,
HDSeed& seed)
{
CKeyingMaterial vchSecret;
// Use seed's fingerprint as IV
// TODO: Handle IV properly when we make encryption a supported feature
if(!DecryptSecret(vMasterKey, vchCryptedSecret, seedFp, vchSecret))
return false;
seed = HDSeed(vchSecret);
return seed.Fingerprint() == seedFp;
}
static bool DecryptKey(const CKeyingMaterial& vMasterKey, const std::vector<unsigned char>& vchCryptedSecret, const CPubKey& vchPubKey, CKey& key)
{
CKeyingMaterial vchSecret;
6 years ago
if (!DecryptSecret(vMasterKey, vchCryptedSecret, vchPubKey.GetHash(), vchSecret))
return false;
if (vchSecret.size() != 32)
return false;
key.Set(vchSecret.begin(), vchSecret.end(), vchPubKey.IsCompressed());
return key.VerifyPubKey(vchPubKey);
}
static bool DecryptSaplingSpendingKey(const CKeyingMaterial& vMasterKey,
const std::vector<unsigned char>& vchCryptedSecret,
const libzcash::SaplingExtendedFullViewingKey& extfvk,
libzcash::SaplingExtendedSpendingKey& sk)
{
CKeyingMaterial vchSecret;
if (!DecryptSecret(vMasterKey, vchCryptedSecret, extfvk.fvk.GetFingerprint(), vchSecret))
return false;
if (vchSecret.size() != ZIP32_XSK_SIZE)
return false;
CSecureDataStream ss(vchSecret, SER_NETWORK, PROTOCOL_VERSION);
ss >> sk;
return sk.expsk.full_viewing_key() == extfvk.fvk;
}
bool CCryptoKeyStore::SetCrypted()
{
LOCK2(cs_KeyStore, cs_SpendingKeyStore);
if (fUseCrypto)
return true;
4 years ago
if (!(mapKeys.empty() && mapSaplingSpendingKeys.empty()))
return false;
fUseCrypto = true;
return true;
}
bool CCryptoKeyStore::Lock()
{
if (!SetCrypted())
return false;
{
LOCK(cs_KeyStore);
vMasterKey.clear();
}
NotifyStatusChanged(this);
return true;
}
bool CCryptoKeyStore::Unlock(const CKeyingMaterial& vMasterKeyIn)
{
{
LOCK2(cs_KeyStore, cs_SpendingKeyStore);
if (!SetCrypted())
return false;
bool keyPass = false;
bool keyFail = false;
if (!cryptedHDSeed.first.IsNull()) {
HDSeed seed;
if (!DecryptHDSeed(vMasterKeyIn, cryptedHDSeed.second, cryptedHDSeed.first, seed))
{
keyFail = true;
} else {
keyPass = true;
}
}
CryptedKeyMap::const_iterator mi = mapCryptedKeys.begin();
for (; mi != mapCryptedKeys.end(); ++mi)
{
const CPubKey &vchPubKey = (*mi).second.first;
const std::vector<unsigned char> &vchCryptedSecret = (*mi).second.second;
CKey key;
if (!DecryptKey(vMasterKeyIn, vchCryptedSecret, vchPubKey, key))
{
keyFail = true;
break;
}
keyPass = true;
if (fDecryptionThoroughlyChecked)
break;
}
CryptedSaplingSpendingKeyMap::const_iterator miSapling = mapCryptedSaplingSpendingKeys.begin();
for (; miSapling != mapCryptedSaplingSpendingKeys.end(); ++miSapling)
{
const libzcash::SaplingExtendedFullViewingKey &extfvk = (*miSapling).first;
const std::vector<unsigned char> &vchCryptedSecret = (*miSapling).second;
libzcash::SaplingExtendedSpendingKey sk;
if (!DecryptSaplingSpendingKey(vMasterKeyIn, vchCryptedSecret, extfvk, sk))
{
keyFail = true;
break;
}
keyPass = true;
if (fDecryptionThoroughlyChecked)
break;
}
if (keyPass && keyFail)
{
4 years ago
LogPrintf("Oh shit! The wallet is probably corrupted: Some keys decrypt but not all.\n");
assert(false);
}
if (keyFail || !keyPass)
return false;
vMasterKey = vMasterKeyIn;
fDecryptionThoroughlyChecked = true;
}
NotifyStatusChanged(this);
return true;
}
bool CCryptoKeyStore::SetHDSeed(const HDSeed& seed)
{
{
LOCK(cs_SpendingKeyStore);
if (!IsCrypted()) {
return CBasicKeyStore::SetHDSeed(seed);
}
if (IsLocked())
return false;
std::vector<unsigned char> vchCryptedSecret;
// Use seed's fingerprint as IV
// TODO: Handle this properly when we make encryption a supported feature
auto seedFp = seed.Fingerprint();
if (!EncryptSecret(vMasterKey, seed.RawSeed(), seedFp, vchCryptedSecret))
return false;
// This will call into CWallet to store the crypted seed to disk
if (!SetCryptedHDSeed(seedFp, vchCryptedSecret))
return false;
}
return true;
}
bool CCryptoKeyStore::SetCryptedHDSeed(
const uint256& seedFp,
const std::vector<unsigned char>& vchCryptedSecret)
{
{
LOCK(cs_SpendingKeyStore);
if (!IsCrypted()) {
return false;
}
if (!cryptedHDSeed.first.IsNull()) {
// Don't allow an existing seed to be changed. We can maybe relax this
// restriction later once we have worked out the UX implications.
return false;
}
cryptedHDSeed = std::make_pair(seedFp, vchCryptedSecret);
}
return true;
}
bool CCryptoKeyStore::HaveHDSeed() const
{
LOCK(cs_SpendingKeyStore);
if (!IsCrypted())
return CBasicKeyStore::HaveHDSeed();
return !cryptedHDSeed.second.empty();
}
bool CCryptoKeyStore::GetHDSeed(HDSeed& seedOut) const
{
LOCK(cs_SpendingKeyStore);
if (!IsCrypted())
return CBasicKeyStore::GetHDSeed(seedOut);
if (cryptedHDSeed.second.empty())
return false;
return DecryptHDSeed(vMasterKey, cryptedHDSeed.second, cryptedHDSeed.first, seedOut);
}
bool CCryptoKeyStore::AddKeyPubKey(const CKey& key, const CPubKey &pubkey)
{
{
LOCK(cs_KeyStore);
if (!IsCrypted())
return CBasicKeyStore::AddKeyPubKey(key, pubkey);
if (IsLocked())
return false;
std::vector<unsigned char> vchCryptedSecret;
CKeyingMaterial vchSecret(key.begin(), key.end());
if (!EncryptSecret(vMasterKey, vchSecret, pubkey.GetHash(), vchCryptedSecret))
return false;
if (!AddCryptedKey(pubkey, vchCryptedSecret))
return false;
}
return true;
}
bool CCryptoKeyStore::AddCryptedKey(const CPubKey &vchPubKey, const std::vector<unsigned char> &vchCryptedSecret)
{
{
LOCK(cs_KeyStore);
if (!SetCrypted())
return false;
mapCryptedKeys[vchPubKey.GetID()] = make_pair(vchPubKey, vchCryptedSecret);
}
return true;
}
bool CCryptoKeyStore::GetKey(const CKeyID &address, CKey& keyOut) const
{
{
LOCK(cs_KeyStore);
if (!IsCrypted())
return CBasicKeyStore::GetKey(address, keyOut);
CryptedKeyMap::const_iterator mi = mapCryptedKeys.find(address);
if (mi != mapCryptedKeys.end())
{
const CPubKey &vchPubKey = (*mi).second.first;
const std::vector<unsigned char> &vchCryptedSecret = (*mi).second.second;
return DecryptKey(vMasterKey, vchCryptedSecret, vchPubKey, keyOut);
}
}
return false;
}
bool CCryptoKeyStore::GetPubKey(const CKeyID &address, CPubKey& vchPubKeyOut) const
{
{
LOCK(cs_KeyStore);
if (!IsCrypted())
return CKeyStore::GetPubKey(address, vchPubKeyOut);
CryptedKeyMap::const_iterator mi = mapCryptedKeys.find(address);
if (mi != mapCryptedKeys.end())
{
vchPubKeyOut = (*mi).second.first;
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
bool CCryptoKeyStore::AddSaplingSpendingKey(
const libzcash::SaplingExtendedSpendingKey &sk,
const libzcash::SaplingPaymentAddress &defaultAddr)
{
{
LOCK(cs_SpendingKeyStore);
if (!IsCrypted()) {
return CBasicKeyStore::AddSaplingSpendingKey(sk, defaultAddr);
}
if (IsLocked()) {
return false;
}
std::vector<unsigned char> vchCryptedSecret;
CSecureDataStream ss(SER_NETWORK, PROTOCOL_VERSION);
ss << sk;
CKeyingMaterial vchSecret(ss.begin(), ss.end());
auto extfvk = sk.ToXFVK();
if (!EncryptSecret(vMasterKey, vchSecret, extfvk.fvk.GetFingerprint(), vchCryptedSecret)) {
return false;
}
if (!AddCryptedSaplingSpendingKey(extfvk, vchCryptedSecret, defaultAddr)) {
return false;
}
}
return true;
}
bool CCryptoKeyStore::AddCryptedSaplingSpendingKey(
const libzcash::SaplingExtendedFullViewingKey &extfvk,
const std::vector<unsigned char> &vchCryptedSecret,
const libzcash::SaplingPaymentAddress &defaultAddr)
{
{
LOCK(cs_SpendingKeyStore);
if (!SetCrypted()) {
return false;
}
// if SaplingFullViewingKey is not in SaplingFullViewingKeyMap, add it
if (!AddSaplingFullViewingKey(extfvk.fvk, defaultAddr)) {
return false;
}
mapCryptedSaplingSpendingKeys[extfvk] = vchCryptedSecret;
}
return true;
}
bool CCryptoKeyStore::GetSaplingSpendingKey(const libzcash::SaplingFullViewingKey &fvk, libzcash::SaplingExtendedSpendingKey &skOut) const
{
{
LOCK(cs_SpendingKeyStore);
if (!IsCrypted())
return CBasicKeyStore::GetSaplingSpendingKey(fvk, skOut);
for (auto entry : mapCryptedSaplingSpendingKeys) {
if (entry.first.fvk == fvk) {
const std::vector<unsigned char> &vchCryptedSecret = entry.second;
return DecryptSaplingSpendingKey(vMasterKey, vchCryptedSecret, entry.first, skOut);
}
}
}
return false;
}
bool CCryptoKeyStore::EncryptKeys(CKeyingMaterial& vMasterKeyIn)
{
{
LOCK2(cs_KeyStore, cs_SpendingKeyStore);
if (!mapCryptedKeys.empty() || IsCrypted())
return false;
fUseCrypto = true;
if (!hdSeed.IsNull()) {
{
std::vector<unsigned char> vchCryptedSecret;
// Use seed's fingerprint as IV
// TODO: Handle this properly when we make encryption a supported feature
auto seedFp = hdSeed.Fingerprint();
if (!EncryptSecret(vMasterKeyIn, hdSeed.RawSeed(), seedFp, vchCryptedSecret)) {
return false;
}
// This will call into CWallet to store the crypted seed to disk
if (!SetCryptedHDSeed(seedFp, vchCryptedSecret)) {
return false;
}
}
hdSeed = HDSeed();
}
BOOST_FOREACH(KeyMap::value_type& mKey, mapKeys)
{
const CKey &key = mKey.second;
CPubKey vchPubKey = key.GetPubKey();
CKeyingMaterial vchSecret(key.begin(), key.end());
std::vector<unsigned char> vchCryptedSecret;
if (!EncryptSecret(vMasterKeyIn, vchSecret, vchPubKey.GetHash(), vchCryptedSecret)) {
return false;
}
if (!AddCryptedKey(vchPubKey, vchCryptedSecret)) {
return false;
}
}
mapKeys.clear();
//! Sapling key support
BOOST_FOREACH(SaplingSpendingKeyMap::value_type& mSaplingSpendingKey, mapSaplingSpendingKeys)
{
const auto &sk = mSaplingSpendingKey.second;
CSecureDataStream ss(SER_NETWORK, PROTOCOL_VERSION);
ss << sk;
CKeyingMaterial vchSecret(ss.begin(), ss.end());
auto extfvk = sk.ToXFVK();
std::vector<unsigned char> vchCryptedSecret;
if (!EncryptSecret(vMasterKeyIn, vchSecret, extfvk.fvk.GetFingerprint(), vchCryptedSecret)) {
return false;
}
if (!AddCryptedSaplingSpendingKey(extfvk, vchCryptedSecret, sk.DefaultAddress())) {
return false;
}
}
mapSaplingSpendingKeys.clear();
}
return true;
}