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@ -1,3 +1,5 @@ |
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#ifndef ENABLE_MODULE_MUSIG |
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/**********************************************************************
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* Copyright (c) 2015 Pieter Wuille, Andrew Poelstra * |
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* Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * |
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@ -238,3 +240,265 @@ static void secp256k1_ecmult_const(secp256k1_gej *r, const secp256k1_ge *a, cons |
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} |
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#endif /* SECP256K1_ECMULT_CONST_IMPL_H */ |
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#else |
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/**********************************************************************
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* Copyright (c) 2015 Pieter Wuille, Andrew Poelstra * |
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* Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * |
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* file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.*
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**********************************************************************/ |
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#ifndef SECP256K1_ECMULT_CONST_IMPL_H |
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#define SECP256K1_ECMULT_CONST_IMPL_H |
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#include "scalar.h" |
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#include "group.h" |
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#include "ecmult_const.h" |
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#include "ecmult_impl.h" |
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/* This is like `ECMULT_TABLE_GET_GE` but is constant time */ |
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#define ECMULT_CONST_TABLE_GET_GE(r,pre,n,w) do { \ |
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int m; \ |
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int abs_n = (n) * (((n) > 0) * 2 - 1); \ |
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int idx_n = abs_n / 2; \ |
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secp256k1_fe neg_y; \ |
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VERIFY_CHECK(((n) & 1) == 1); \ |
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VERIFY_CHECK((n) >= -((1 << ((w)-1)) - 1)); \ |
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VERIFY_CHECK((n) <= ((1 << ((w)-1)) - 1)); \ |
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VERIFY_SETUP(secp256k1_fe_clear(&(r)->x)); \ |
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VERIFY_SETUP(secp256k1_fe_clear(&(r)->y)); \ |
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for (m = 0; m < ECMULT_TABLE_SIZE(w); m++) { \ |
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/* This loop is used to avoid secret data in array indices. See
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* the comment in ecmult_gen_impl.h for rationale. */ \ |
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secp256k1_fe_cmov(&(r)->x, &(pre)[m].x, m == idx_n); \ |
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secp256k1_fe_cmov(&(r)->y, &(pre)[m].y, m == idx_n); \ |
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} \ |
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(r)->infinity = 0; \ |
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secp256k1_fe_negate(&neg_y, &(r)->y, 1); \ |
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secp256k1_fe_cmov(&(r)->y, &neg_y, (n) != abs_n); \ |
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} while(0) |
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/** Convert a number to WNAF notation.
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* The number becomes represented by sum(2^{wi} * wnaf[i], i=0..WNAF_SIZE(w)+1) - return_val. |
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* It has the following guarantees: |
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* - each wnaf[i] an odd integer between -(1 << w) and (1 << w) |
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* - each wnaf[i] is nonzero |
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* - the number of words set is always WNAF_SIZE(w) + 1 |
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* |
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* Adapted from `The Width-w NAF Method Provides Small Memory and Fast Elliptic Scalar |
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* Multiplications Secure against Side Channel Attacks`, Okeya and Tagaki. M. Joye (Ed.) |
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* CT-RSA 2003, LNCS 2612, pp. 328-443, 2003. Springer-Verlagy Berlin Heidelberg 2003 |
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* |
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* Numbers reference steps of `Algorithm SPA-resistant Width-w NAF with Odd Scalar` on pp. 335 |
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*/ |
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static int secp256k1_wnaf_const(int *wnaf, secp256k1_scalar s, int w, int size) { |
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int global_sign; |
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int skew = 0; |
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int word = 0; |
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/* 1 2 3 */ |
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int u_last; |
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int u; |
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int flip; |
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int bit; |
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secp256k1_scalar neg_s; |
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int not_neg_one; |
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/* Note that we cannot handle even numbers by negating them to be odd, as is
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* done in other implementations, since if our scalars were specified to have |
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* width < 256 for performance reasons, their negations would have width 256 |
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* and we'd lose any performance benefit. Instead, we use a technique from |
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* Section 4.2 of the Okeya/Tagaki paper, which is to add either 1 (for even) |
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* or 2 (for odd) to the number we are encoding, returning a skew value indicating |
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* this, and having the caller compensate after doing the multiplication. |
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* |
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* In fact, we _do_ want to negate numbers to minimize their bit-lengths (and in |
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* particular, to ensure that the outputs from the endomorphism-split fit into |
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* 128 bits). If we negate, the parity of our number flips, inverting which of |
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* {1, 2} we want to add to the scalar when ensuring that it's odd. Further |
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* complicating things, -1 interacts badly with `secp256k1_scalar_cadd_bit` and |
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* we need to special-case it in this logic. */ |
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flip = secp256k1_scalar_is_high(&s); |
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/* We add 1 to even numbers, 2 to odd ones, noting that negation flips parity */ |
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bit = flip ^ !secp256k1_scalar_is_even(&s); |
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/* We check for negative one, since adding 2 to it will cause an overflow */ |
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secp256k1_scalar_negate(&neg_s, &s); |
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not_neg_one = !secp256k1_scalar_is_one(&neg_s); |
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secp256k1_scalar_cadd_bit(&s, bit, not_neg_one); |
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/* If we had negative one, flip == 1, s.d[0] == 0, bit == 1, so caller expects
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* that we added two to it and flipped it. In fact for -1 these operations are |
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* identical. We only flipped, but since skewing is required (in the sense that |
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* the skew must be 1 or 2, never zero) and flipping is not, we need to change |
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* our flags to claim that we only skewed. */ |
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global_sign = secp256k1_scalar_cond_negate(&s, flip); |
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global_sign *= not_neg_one * 2 - 1; |
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skew = 1 << bit; |
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/* 4 */ |
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u_last = secp256k1_scalar_shr_int(&s, w); |
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while (word * w < size) { |
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int sign; |
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int even; |
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/* 4.1 4.4 */ |
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u = secp256k1_scalar_shr_int(&s, w); |
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/* 4.2 */ |
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even = ((u & 1) == 0); |
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sign = 2 * (u_last > 0) - 1; |
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u += sign * even; |
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u_last -= sign * even * (1 << w); |
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/* 4.3, adapted for global sign change */ |
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wnaf[word++] = u_last * global_sign; |
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u_last = u; |
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} |
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wnaf[word] = u * global_sign; |
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VERIFY_CHECK(secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&s)); |
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VERIFY_CHECK(word == WNAF_SIZE_BITS(size, w)); |
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return skew; |
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} |
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static void secp256k1_ecmult_const(secp256k1_gej *r, const secp256k1_ge *a, const secp256k1_scalar *scalar, int size) { |
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secp256k1_ge pre_a[ECMULT_TABLE_SIZE(WINDOW_A)]; |
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secp256k1_ge tmpa; |
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secp256k1_fe Z; |
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int skew_1; |
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#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM |
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secp256k1_ge pre_a_lam[ECMULT_TABLE_SIZE(WINDOW_A)]; |
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int wnaf_lam[1 + WNAF_SIZE(WINDOW_A - 1)]; |
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int skew_lam; |
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secp256k1_scalar q_1, q_lam; |
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#endif |
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int wnaf_1[1 + WNAF_SIZE(WINDOW_A - 1)]; |
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int i; |
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secp256k1_scalar sc = *scalar; |
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/* build wnaf representation for q. */ |
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int rsize = size; |
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#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM |
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if (size > 128) { |
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rsize = 128; |
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/* split q into q_1 and q_lam (where q = q_1 + q_lam*lambda, and q_1 and q_lam are ~128 bit) */ |
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secp256k1_scalar_split_lambda(&q_1, &q_lam, &sc); |
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skew_1 = secp256k1_wnaf_const(wnaf_1, q_1, WINDOW_A - 1, 128); |
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skew_lam = secp256k1_wnaf_const(wnaf_lam, q_lam, WINDOW_A - 1, 128); |
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} else |
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#endif |
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{ |
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skew_1 = secp256k1_wnaf_const(wnaf_1, sc, WINDOW_A - 1, size); |
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#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM |
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skew_lam = 0; |
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#endif |
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} |
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/* Calculate odd multiples of a.
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* All multiples are brought to the same Z 'denominator', which is stored |
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* in Z. Due to secp256k1' isomorphism we can do all operations pretending |
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* that the Z coordinate was 1, use affine addition formulae, and correct |
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* the Z coordinate of the result once at the end. |
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*/ |
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secp256k1_gej_set_ge(r, a); |
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secp256k1_ecmult_odd_multiples_table_globalz_windowa(pre_a, &Z, r); |
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for (i = 0; i < ECMULT_TABLE_SIZE(WINDOW_A); i++) { |
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secp256k1_fe_normalize_weak(&pre_a[i].y); |
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} |
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#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM |
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if (size > 128) { |
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for (i = 0; i < ECMULT_TABLE_SIZE(WINDOW_A); i++) { |
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secp256k1_ge_mul_lambda(&pre_a_lam[i], &pre_a[i]); |
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} |
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} |
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#endif |
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/* first loop iteration (separated out so we can directly set r, rather
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* than having it start at infinity, get doubled several times, then have |
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* its new value added to it) */ |
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i = wnaf_1[WNAF_SIZE_BITS(rsize, WINDOW_A - 1)]; |
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VERIFY_CHECK(i != 0); |
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ECMULT_CONST_TABLE_GET_GE(&tmpa, pre_a, i, WINDOW_A); |
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secp256k1_gej_set_ge(r, &tmpa); |
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#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM |
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if (size > 128) { |
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i = wnaf_lam[WNAF_SIZE_BITS(rsize, WINDOW_A - 1)]; |
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VERIFY_CHECK(i != 0); |
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ECMULT_CONST_TABLE_GET_GE(&tmpa, pre_a_lam, i, WINDOW_A); |
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secp256k1_gej_add_ge(r, r, &tmpa); |
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} |
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#endif |
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/* remaining loop iterations */ |
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for (i = WNAF_SIZE_BITS(rsize, WINDOW_A - 1) - 1; i >= 0; i--) { |
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int n; |
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int j; |
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for (j = 0; j < WINDOW_A - 1; ++j) { |
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secp256k1_gej_double_nonzero(r, r, NULL); |
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} |
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n = wnaf_1[i]; |
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ECMULT_CONST_TABLE_GET_GE(&tmpa, pre_a, n, WINDOW_A); |
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VERIFY_CHECK(n != 0); |
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secp256k1_gej_add_ge(r, r, &tmpa); |
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#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM |
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if (size > 128) { |
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n = wnaf_lam[i]; |
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ECMULT_CONST_TABLE_GET_GE(&tmpa, pre_a_lam, n, WINDOW_A); |
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VERIFY_CHECK(n != 0); |
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secp256k1_gej_add_ge(r, r, &tmpa); |
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} |
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#endif |
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} |
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secp256k1_fe_mul(&r->z, &r->z, &Z); |
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{ |
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/* Correct for wNAF skew */ |
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secp256k1_ge correction = *a; |
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secp256k1_ge_storage correction_1_stor; |
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#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM |
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secp256k1_ge_storage correction_lam_stor; |
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#endif |
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secp256k1_ge_storage a2_stor; |
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secp256k1_gej tmpj; |
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secp256k1_gej_set_ge(&tmpj, &correction); |
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secp256k1_gej_double_var(&tmpj, &tmpj, NULL); |
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secp256k1_ge_set_gej(&correction, &tmpj); |
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secp256k1_ge_to_storage(&correction_1_stor, a); |
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#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM |
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if (size > 128) { |
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secp256k1_ge_to_storage(&correction_lam_stor, a); |
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} |
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#endif |
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secp256k1_ge_to_storage(&a2_stor, &correction); |
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/* For odd numbers this is 2a (so replace it), for even ones a (so no-op) */ |
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secp256k1_ge_storage_cmov(&correction_1_stor, &a2_stor, skew_1 == 2); |
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#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM |
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if (size > 128) { |
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secp256k1_ge_storage_cmov(&correction_lam_stor, &a2_stor, skew_lam == 2); |
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} |
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#endif |
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/* Apply the correction */ |
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secp256k1_ge_from_storage(&correction, &correction_1_stor); |
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secp256k1_ge_neg(&correction, &correction); |
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secp256k1_gej_add_ge(r, r, &correction); |
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#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM |
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if (size > 128) { |
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secp256k1_ge_from_storage(&correction, &correction_lam_stor); |
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secp256k1_ge_neg(&correction, &correction); |
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secp256k1_ge_mul_lambda(&correction, &correction); |
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secp256k1_gej_add_ge(r, r, &correction); |
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} |
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#endif |
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} |
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} |
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#endif /* SECP256K1_ECMULT_CONST_IMPL_H */ |
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#endif |
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