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Auto merge of #2177 - str4d:2061-tor-ephemeral-hs, r=daira

Tor ephemeral hidden services

Cherry-picked from the following upstream PRs:

- bitcoin/bitcoin#6503 (included to reduce merge conflicts)
- bitcoin/bitcoin#6639
- bitcoin/bitcoin#6643
- bitcoin/bitcoin#7090
- bitcoin/bitcoin#7035
- bitcoin/bitcoin#7170
- bitcoin/bitcoin#7218 (non-QT part)
- bitcoin/bitcoin#7313
- bitcoin/bitcoin#7438
- bitcoin/bitcoin#7553
- bitcoin/bitcoin#7637
- bitcoin/bitcoin#7683
- bitcoin/bitcoin#7813
- bitcoin/bitcoin#7703
- bitcoin/bitcoin#8203
- bitcoin/bitcoin#9004
- bitcoin/bitcoin#9234
- bitcoin/bitcoin#9911 (partial)

Closes #2061.
pull/4/head
zkbot 7 years ago
parent
commit
45faa928ec
  1. 2
      doc/files.md
  2. 45
      doc/tor.md
  3. 1
      qa/rpc-tests/test_framework/util.py
  4. 2
      src/Makefile.am
  5. 3
      src/Makefile.test.include
  6. 24
      src/init.cpp
  7. 2
      src/main.cpp
  8. 41
      src/net.cpp
  9. 4
      src/net.h
  10. 5
      src/netbase.cpp
  11. 4
      src/netbase.h
  12. 4
      src/streams.h
  13. 168
      src/test/torcontrol_tests.cpp
  14. 726
      src/torcontrol.cpp
  15. 20
      src/torcontrol.h

2
doc/files.md

@ -10,3 +10,5 @@
* fee_estimates.dat: stores statistics used to estimate minimum transaction fees and priorities required for confirmation
* peers.dat: peer IP address database (custom format)
* wallet.dat: personal wallet (BDB) with keys and transactions
* .cookie: session RPC authentication cookie (written at start when cookie authentication is used, deleted on shutdown): since 0.12.0
* onion_private_key: cached Tor hidden service private key for `-listenonion`: since 0.12.0

45
doc/tor.md

@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ TOR SUPPORT IN ZCASH
It is possible to run Zcash as a Tor hidden service, and connect to such services.
The following directions assume you have a Tor proxy running on port 9050. Many distributions default to having a SOCKS proxy listening on port 9050, but others may not. In particular, the Tor Browser Bundle defaults to listening on a random port. See [Tor Project FAQ:TBBSocksPort](https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq.html.en#TBBSocksPort) for how to properly
The following directions assume you have a Tor proxy running on port 9050. Many distributions default to having a SOCKS proxy listening on port 9050, but others may not. In particular, the Tor Browser Bundle defaults to listening on port 9150. See [Tor Project FAQ:TBBSocksPort](https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq.html.en#TBBSocksPort) for how to properly
configure Tor.
@ -72,9 +72,14 @@ In a typical situation, where you're only reachable via Tor, this should suffice
./zcashd -proxy=127.0.0.1:9050 -externalip=zctestseie6wxgio.onion -listen
(obviously, replace the Onion address with your own). If you don't care too much
about hiding your node, and want to be reachable on IPv4 as well, additionally
specify:
(obviously, replace the Onion address with your own). It should be noted that you still
listen on all devices and another node could establish a clearnet connection, when knowing
your address. To mitigate this, additionally bind the address of your Tor proxy:
./bitcoind ... -bind=127.0.0.1
If you don't care too much about hiding your node, and want to be reachable on IPv4
as well, use `discover` instead:
./zcashd ... -discover
@ -86,7 +91,37 @@ for normal IPv4/IPv6 communication, use:
./zcashd -onion=127.0.0.1:9050 -externalip=zctestseie6wxgio.onion -discover
3. Connect to a Zcash hidden server
3. Automatically listen on Tor
--------------------------------
Starting with Tor version 0.2.7.1 it is possible, through Tor's control socket
API, to create and destroy 'ephemeral' hidden services programmatically.
Zcash has been updated to make use of this.
This means that if Tor is running (and proper authentication has been configured),
Zcash automatically creates a hidden service to listen on. Zcash will also use Tor
automatically to connect to other .onion nodes if the control socket can be
successfully opened. This will positively affect the number of available .onion
nodes and their usage.
This new feature is enabled by default if Zcash is listening (`-listen`), and
requires a Tor connection to work. It can be explicitly disabled with `-listenonion=0`
and, if not disabled, configured using the `-torcontrol` and `-torpassword` settings.
To show verbose debugging information, pass `-debug=tor`.
Connecting to Tor's control socket API requires one of two authentication methods to be
configured. For cookie authentication the user running zcashd must have write access
to the `CookieAuthFile` specified in Tor configuration. In some cases this is
preconfigured and the creation of a hidden service is automatic. If permission problems
are seen with `-debug=tor` they can be resolved by adding both the user running tor and
the user running zcashd to the same group and setting permissions appropriately. On
Debian-based systems the user running zcashd can be added to the debian-tor group,
which has the appropriate permissions. An alternative authentication method is the use
of the `-torpassword` flag and a `hash-password` which can be enabled and specified in
Tor configuration.
4. Connect to a Zcash hidden server
-----------------------------------
To test your set-up, you might want to try connecting via Tor on a different computer to just a

1
qa/rpc-tests/test_framework/util.py

@ -83,6 +83,7 @@ def initialize_datadir(dirname, n):
f.write("rpcpassword=rt\n");
f.write("port="+str(p2p_port(n))+"\n");
f.write("rpcport="+str(rpc_port(n))+"\n");
f.write("listenonion=0\n");
return datadir
def initialize_chain(test_dir):

2
src/Makefile.am

@ -164,6 +164,7 @@ BITCOIN_CORE_H = \
threadsafety.h \
timedata.h \
tinyformat.h \
torcontrol.h \
txdb.h \
txmempool.h \
ui_interface.h \
@ -227,6 +228,7 @@ libbitcoin_server_a_SOURCES = \
rpcserver.cpp \
script/sigcache.cpp \
timedata.cpp \
torcontrol.cpp \
txdb.cpp \
txmempool.cpp \
validationinterface.cpp \

3
src/Makefile.test.include

@ -84,6 +84,7 @@ BITCOIN_TESTS =\
test/test_bitcoin.cpp \
test/test_bitcoin.h \
test/timedata_tests.cpp \
test/torcontrol_tests.cpp \
test/transaction_tests.cpp \
test/uint256_tests.cpp \
test/univalue_tests.cpp \
@ -100,7 +101,7 @@ endif
test_test_bitcoin_SOURCES = $(BITCOIN_TESTS) $(JSON_TEST_FILES) $(RAW_TEST_FILES)
test_test_bitcoin_CPPFLAGS = -fopenmp $(BITCOIN_INCLUDES) -I$(builddir)/test/ $(TESTDEFS) $(EVENT_CFLAGS)
test_test_bitcoin_LDADD = $(LIBBITCOIN_SERVER) $(LIBBITCOIN_CLI) $(LIBBITCOIN_COMMON) $(LIBBITCOIN_UTIL) $(LIBBITCOIN_CRYPTO) $(LIBUNIVALUE) $(LIBLEVELDB) $(LIBMEMENV) \
$(BOOST_LIBS) $(BOOST_UNIT_TEST_FRAMEWORK_LIB) $(LIBSECP256K1) $(EVENT_LIBS)
$(BOOST_LIBS) $(BOOST_UNIT_TEST_FRAMEWORK_LIB) $(LIBSECP256K1) $(EVENT_PTHREADS_LIBS) $(EVENT_LIBS)
if ENABLE_WALLET
test_test_bitcoin_LDADD += $(LIBBITCOIN_WALLET)
endif

24
src/init.cpp

@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
#include "script/standard.h"
#include "scheduler.h"
#include "txdb.h"
#include "torcontrol.h"
#include "ui_interface.h"
#include "util.h"
#include "utilmoneystr.h"
@ -159,6 +160,7 @@ void Interrupt(boost::thread_group& threadGroup)
InterruptHTTPRPC();
InterruptRPC();
InterruptREST();
InterruptTorControl();
threadGroup.interrupt_all();
}
@ -193,6 +195,7 @@ void Shutdown()
#endif
#endif
StopNode();
StopTorControl();
UnregisterNodeSignals(GetNodeSignals());
if (fFeeEstimatesInitialized)
@ -355,7 +358,8 @@ std::string HelpMessage(HelpMessageMode mode)
strUsage += HelpMessageOpt("-externalip=<ip>", _("Specify your own public address"));
strUsage += HelpMessageOpt("-forcednsseed", strprintf(_("Always query for peer addresses via DNS lookup (default: %u)"), 0));
strUsage += HelpMessageOpt("-listen", _("Accept connections from outside (default: 1 if no -proxy or -connect)"));
strUsage += HelpMessageOpt("-maxconnections=<n>", strprintf(_("Maintain at most <n> connections to peers (default: %u)"), 125));
strUsage += HelpMessageOpt("-listenonion", strprintf(_("Automatically create Tor hidden service (default: %d)"), DEFAULT_LISTEN_ONION));
strUsage += HelpMessageOpt("-maxconnections=<n>", strprintf(_("Maintain at most <n> connections to peers (default: %u)"), DEFAULT_MAX_PEER_CONNECTIONS));
strUsage += HelpMessageOpt("-maxreceivebuffer=<n>", strprintf(_("Maximum per-connection receive buffer, <n>*1000 bytes (default: %u)"), 5000));
strUsage += HelpMessageOpt("-maxsendbuffer=<n>", strprintf(_("Maximum per-connection send buffer, <n>*1000 bytes (default: %u)"), 1000));
strUsage += HelpMessageOpt("-onion=<ip:port>", strprintf(_("Use separate SOCKS5 proxy to reach peers via Tor hidden services (default: %s)"), "-proxy"));
@ -366,6 +370,8 @@ std::string HelpMessage(HelpMessageMode mode)
strUsage += HelpMessageOpt("-proxyrandomize", strprintf(_("Randomize credentials for every proxy connection. This enables Tor stream isolation (default: %u)"), 1));
strUsage += HelpMessageOpt("-seednode=<ip>", _("Connect to a node to retrieve peer addresses, and disconnect"));
strUsage += HelpMessageOpt("-timeout=<n>", strprintf(_("Specify connection timeout in milliseconds (minimum: 1, default: %d)"), DEFAULT_CONNECT_TIMEOUT));
strUsage += HelpMessageOpt("-torcontrol=<ip>:<port>", strprintf(_("Tor control port to use if onion listening enabled (default: %s)"), DEFAULT_TOR_CONTROL));
strUsage += HelpMessageOpt("-torpassword=<pass>", _("Tor control port password (default: empty)"));
#ifdef USE_UPNP
#if USE_UPNP
strUsage += HelpMessageOpt("-upnp", _("Use UPnP to map the listening port (default: 1 when listening and no -proxy)"));
@ -421,7 +427,7 @@ std::string HelpMessage(HelpMessageMode mode)
strUsage += HelpMessageOpt("-stopafterblockimport", strprintf("Stop running after importing blocks from disk (default: %u)", 0));
}
string debugCategories = "addrman, alert, bench, coindb, db, estimatefee, http, libevent, lock, mempool, net, partitioncheck, pow, proxy, prune, "
"rand, reindex, rpc, selectcoins, zmq, zrpc, zrpcunsafe (implies zrpc)"; // Don't translate these
"rand, reindex, rpc, selectcoins, tor, zmq, zrpc, zrpcunsafe (implies zrpc)"; // Don't translate these
strUsage += HelpMessageOpt("-debug=<category>", strprintf(_("Output debugging information (default: %u, supplying <category> is optional)"), 0) + ". " +
_("If <category> is not supplied or if <category> = 1, output all debugging information.") + " " + _("<category> can be:") + " " + debugCategories + ".");
strUsage += HelpMessageOpt("-experimentalfeatures", _("Enable use of experimental features"));
@ -810,6 +816,8 @@ bool AppInit2(boost::thread_group& threadGroup, CScheduler& scheduler)
LogPrintf("%s: parameter interaction: -listen=0 -> setting -upnp=0\n", __func__);
if (SoftSetBoolArg("-discover", false))
LogPrintf("%s: parameter interaction: -listen=0 -> setting -discover=0\n", __func__);
if (SoftSetBoolArg("-listenonion", false))
LogPrintf("%s: parameter interaction: -listen=0 -> setting -listenonion=0\n", __func__);
}
if (mapArgs.count("-externalip")) {
@ -832,7 +840,7 @@ bool AppInit2(boost::thread_group& threadGroup, CScheduler& scheduler)
// Make sure enough file descriptors are available
int nBind = std::max((int)mapArgs.count("-bind") + (int)mapArgs.count("-whitebind"), 1);
nMaxConnections = GetArg("-maxconnections", 125);
nMaxConnections = GetArg("-maxconnections", DEFAULT_MAX_PEER_CONNECTIONS);
nMaxConnections = std::max(std::min(nMaxConnections, (int)(FD_SETSIZE - nBind - MIN_CORE_FILEDESCRIPTORS)), 0);
int nFD = RaiseFileDescriptorLimit(nMaxConnections + MIN_CORE_FILEDESCRIPTORS);
if (nFD < MIN_CORE_FILEDESCRIPTORS)
@ -1149,6 +1157,7 @@ bool AppInit2(boost::thread_group& threadGroup, CScheduler& scheduler)
// -proxy sets a proxy for all outgoing network traffic
// -noproxy (or -proxy=0) as well as the empty string can be used to not set a proxy, this is the default
std::string proxyArg = GetArg("-proxy", "");
SetLimited(NET_TOR);
if (proxyArg != "" && proxyArg != "0") {
proxyType addrProxy = proxyType(CService(proxyArg, 9050), proxyRandomize);
if (!addrProxy.IsValid())
@ -1158,7 +1167,7 @@ bool AppInit2(boost::thread_group& threadGroup, CScheduler& scheduler)
SetProxy(NET_IPV6, addrProxy);
SetProxy(NET_TOR, addrProxy);
SetNameProxy(addrProxy);
SetReachable(NET_TOR); // by default, -proxy sets onion as reachable, unless -noonion later
SetLimited(NET_TOR, false); // by default, -proxy sets onion as reachable, unless -noonion later
}
// -onion can be used to set only a proxy for .onion, or override normal proxy for .onion addresses
@ -1167,13 +1176,13 @@ bool AppInit2(boost::thread_group& threadGroup, CScheduler& scheduler)
std::string onionArg = GetArg("-onion", "");
if (onionArg != "") {
if (onionArg == "0") { // Handle -noonion/-onion=0
SetReachable(NET_TOR, false); // set onions as unreachable
SetLimited(NET_TOR); // set onions as unreachable
} else {
proxyType addrOnion = proxyType(CService(onionArg, 9050), proxyRandomize);
if (!addrOnion.IsValid())
return InitError(strprintf(_("Invalid -onion address: '%s'"), onionArg));
SetProxy(NET_TOR, addrOnion);
SetReachable(NET_TOR);
SetLimited(NET_TOR, false);
}
}
@ -1614,6 +1623,9 @@ bool AppInit2(boost::thread_group& threadGroup, CScheduler& scheduler)
LogPrintf("mapAddressBook.size() = %u\n", pwalletMain ? pwalletMain->mapAddressBook.size() : 0);
#endif
if (GetBoolArg("-listenonion", DEFAULT_LISTEN_ONION))
StartTorControl(threadGroup, scheduler);
StartNode(threadGroup, scheduler);
// Monitor the chain, and alert if we get blocks much quicker or slower than expected

2
src/main.cpp

@ -4402,9 +4402,11 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, string strCommand, CDataStream& vRecv,
CAddress addr = GetLocalAddress(&pfrom->addr);
if (addr.IsRoutable())
{
LogPrintf("ProcessMessages: advertizing address %s\n", addr.ToString());
pfrom->PushAddress(addr);
} else if (IsPeerAddrLocalGood(pfrom)) {
addr.SetIP(pfrom->addrLocal);
LogPrintf("ProcessMessages: advertizing address %s\n", addr.ToString());
pfrom->PushAddress(addr);
}
}

41
src/net.cpp

@ -72,13 +72,12 @@ bool fListen = true;
uint64_t nLocalServices = NODE_NETWORK;
CCriticalSection cs_mapLocalHost;
map<CNetAddr, LocalServiceInfo> mapLocalHost;
static bool vfReachable[NET_MAX] = {};
static bool vfLimited[NET_MAX] = {};
static CNode* pnodeLocalHost = NULL;
uint64_t nLocalHostNonce = 0;
static std::vector<ListenSocket> vhListenSocket;
CAddrMan addrman;
int nMaxConnections = 125;
int nMaxConnections = DEFAULT_MAX_PEER_CONNECTIONS;
bool fAddressesInitialized = false;
vector<CNode*> vNodes;
@ -212,19 +211,12 @@ void AdvertizeLocal(CNode *pnode)
}
if (addrLocal.IsRoutable())
{
LogPrintf("AdvertizeLocal: advertizing address %s\n", addrLocal.ToString());
pnode->PushAddress(addrLocal);
}
}
}
void SetReachable(enum Network net, bool fFlag)
{
LOCK(cs_mapLocalHost);
vfReachable[net] = fFlag;
if (net == NET_IPV6 && fFlag)
vfReachable[NET_IPV4] = true;
}
// learn a new local address
bool AddLocal(const CService& addr, int nScore)
{
@ -247,7 +239,6 @@ bool AddLocal(const CService& addr, int nScore)
info.nScore = nScore + (fAlready ? 1 : 0);
info.nPort = addr.GetPort();
}
SetReachable(addr.GetNetwork());
}
return true;
@ -258,6 +249,14 @@ bool AddLocal(const CNetAddr &addr, int nScore)
return AddLocal(CService(addr, GetListenPort()), nScore);
}
bool RemoveLocal(const CService& addr)
{
LOCK(cs_mapLocalHost);
LogPrintf("RemoveLocal(%s)\n", addr.ToString());
mapLocalHost.erase(addr);
return true;
}
/** Make a particular network entirely off-limits (no automatic connects to it) */
void SetLimited(enum Network net, bool fLimited)
{
@ -302,7 +301,7 @@ bool IsLocal(const CService& addr)
bool IsReachable(enum Network net)
{
LOCK(cs_mapLocalHost);
return vfReachable[net] && !vfLimited[net];
return !vfLimited[net];
}
/** check whether a given address is in a network we can probably connect to */
@ -812,8 +811,6 @@ static bool AttemptToEvictConnection(bool fPreferNewConnection) {
continue;
if (node->fDisconnect)
continue;
if (node->addr.IsLocal())
continue;
vEvictionCandidates.push_back(CNodeRef(node));
}
}
@ -844,15 +841,20 @@ static bool AttemptToEvictConnection(bool fPreferNewConnection) {
if (vEvictionCandidates.empty()) return false;
// Identify the network group with the most connections
// Identify the network group with the most connections and youngest member.
// (vEvictionCandidates is already sorted by reverse connect time)
std::vector<unsigned char> naMostConnections;
unsigned int nMostConnections = 0;
int64_t nMostConnectionsTime = 0;
std::map<std::vector<unsigned char>, std::vector<CNodeRef> > mapAddrCounts;
BOOST_FOREACH(const CNodeRef &node, vEvictionCandidates) {
mapAddrCounts[node->addr.GetGroup()].push_back(node);
int64_t grouptime = mapAddrCounts[node->addr.GetGroup()][0]->nTimeConnected;
size_t groupsize = mapAddrCounts[node->addr.GetGroup()].size();
if (mapAddrCounts[node->addr.GetGroup()].size() > nMostConnections) {
nMostConnections = mapAddrCounts[node->addr.GetGroup()].size();
if (groupsize > nMostConnections || (groupsize == nMostConnections && grouptime > nMostConnectionsTime)) {
nMostConnections = groupsize;
nMostConnectionsTime = grouptime;
naMostConnections = node->addr.GetGroup();
}
}
@ -860,14 +862,13 @@ static bool AttemptToEvictConnection(bool fPreferNewConnection) {
// Reduce to the network group with the most connections
vEvictionCandidates = mapAddrCounts[naMostConnections];
// Do not disconnect peers if there is only 1 connection from their network group
// Do not disconnect peers if there is only one unprotected connection from their network group.
if (vEvictionCandidates.size() <= 1)
// unless we prefer the new connection (for whitelisted peers)
if (!fPreferNewConnection)
return false;
// Disconnect the most recent connection from the network group with the most connections
std::sort(vEvictionCandidates.begin(), vEvictionCandidates.end(), ReverseCompareNodeTimeConnected);
// Disconnect from the network group with the most connections
vEvictionCandidates[0]->fDisconnect = true;
return true;

4
src/net.h

@ -61,6 +61,8 @@ static const bool DEFAULT_UPNP = false;
static const size_t MAPASKFOR_MAX_SZ = MAX_INV_SZ;
/** The maximum number of entries in setAskFor (larger due to getdata latency)*/
static const size_t SETASKFOR_MAX_SZ = 2 * MAX_INV_SZ;
/** The maximum number of peer connections to maintain. */
static const unsigned int DEFAULT_MAX_PEER_CONNECTIONS = 125;
unsigned int ReceiveFloodSize();
unsigned int SendBufferSize();
@ -129,12 +131,12 @@ bool IsLimited(enum Network net);
bool IsLimited(const CNetAddr& addr);
bool AddLocal(const CService& addr, int nScore = LOCAL_NONE);
bool AddLocal(const CNetAddr& addr, int nScore = LOCAL_NONE);
bool RemoveLocal(const CService& addr);
bool SeenLocal(const CService& addr);
bool IsLocal(const CService& addr);
bool GetLocal(CService &addr, const CNetAddr *paddrPeer = NULL);
bool IsReachable(enum Network net);
bool IsReachable(const CNetAddr &addr);
void SetReachable(enum Network net, bool fFlag = true);
CAddress GetLocalAddress(const CNetAddr *paddrPeer = NULL);

5
src/netbase.cpp

@ -227,10 +227,7 @@ bool LookupNumeric(const char *pszName, CService& addr, int portDefault)
return Lookup(pszName, addr, portDefault, false);
}
/**
* Convert milliseconds to a struct timeval for select.
*/
struct timeval static MillisToTimeval(int64_t nTimeout)
struct timeval MillisToTimeval(int64_t nTimeout)
{
struct timeval timeout;
timeout.tv_sec = nTimeout / 1000;

4
src/netbase.h

@ -203,5 +203,9 @@ std::string NetworkErrorString(int err);
bool CloseSocket(SOCKET& hSocket);
/** Disable or enable blocking-mode for a socket */
bool SetSocketNonBlocking(SOCKET& hSocket, bool fNonBlocking);
/**
* Convert milliseconds to a struct timeval for e.g. select.
*/
struct timeval MillisToTimeval(int64_t nTimeout);
#endif // BITCOIN_NETBASE_H

4
src/streams.h

@ -295,8 +295,8 @@ public:
return (*this);
}
void GetAndClear(CSerializeData &data) {
data.insert(data.end(), begin(), end());
void GetAndClear(CSerializeData &d) {
d.insert(d.end(), begin(), end());
clear();
}
};

168
src/test/torcontrol_tests.cpp

@ -0,0 +1,168 @@
// Copyright (c) 2017 The Zcash developers
// Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying
// file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.
//
#include "test/test_bitcoin.h"
#include "torcontrol.cpp"
#include <boost/test/unit_test.hpp>
BOOST_FIXTURE_TEST_SUITE(torcontrol_tests, BasicTestingSetup)
void CheckSplitTorReplyLine(std::string input, std::string command, std::string args)
{
BOOST_TEST_MESSAGE(std::string("CheckSplitTorReplyLine(") + input + ")");
auto ret = SplitTorReplyLine(input);
BOOST_CHECK_EQUAL(ret.first, command);
BOOST_CHECK_EQUAL(ret.second, args);
}
BOOST_AUTO_TEST_CASE(util_SplitTorReplyLine)
{
// Data we should receive during normal usage
CheckSplitTorReplyLine(
"PROTOCOLINFO PIVERSION",
"PROTOCOLINFO", "PIVERSION");
CheckSplitTorReplyLine(
"AUTH METHODS=COOKIE,SAFECOOKIE COOKIEFILE=\"/home/x/.tor/control_auth_cookie\"",
"AUTH", "METHODS=COOKIE,SAFECOOKIE COOKIEFILE=\"/home/x/.tor/control_auth_cookie\"");
CheckSplitTorReplyLine(
"AUTH METHODS=NULL",
"AUTH", "METHODS=NULL");
CheckSplitTorReplyLine(
"AUTH METHODS=HASHEDPASSWORD",
"AUTH", "METHODS=HASHEDPASSWORD");
CheckSplitTorReplyLine(
"VERSION Tor=\"0.2.9.8 (git-a0df013ea241b026)\"",
"VERSION", "Tor=\"0.2.9.8 (git-a0df013ea241b026)\"");
CheckSplitTorReplyLine(
"AUTHCHALLENGE SERVERHASH=aaaa SERVERNONCE=bbbb",
"AUTHCHALLENGE", "SERVERHASH=aaaa SERVERNONCE=bbbb");
// Other valid inputs
CheckSplitTorReplyLine("COMMAND", "COMMAND", "");
CheckSplitTorReplyLine("COMMAND SOME ARGS", "COMMAND", "SOME ARGS");
// These inputs are valid because PROTOCOLINFO accepts an OtherLine that is
// just an OptArguments, which enables multiple spaces to be present
// between the command and arguments.
CheckSplitTorReplyLine("COMMAND ARGS", "COMMAND", " ARGS");
CheckSplitTorReplyLine("COMMAND EVEN+more ARGS", "COMMAND", " EVEN+more ARGS");
}
void CheckParseTorReplyMapping(std::string input, std::map<std::string,std::string> expected)
{
BOOST_TEST_MESSAGE(std::string("CheckParseTorReplyMapping(") + input + ")");
auto ret = ParseTorReplyMapping(input);
BOOST_CHECK_EQUAL(ret.size(), expected.size());
auto r_it = ret.begin();
auto e_it = expected.begin();
while (r_it != ret.end() && e_it != expected.end()) {
BOOST_CHECK_EQUAL(r_it->first, e_it->first);
BOOST_CHECK_EQUAL(r_it->second, e_it->second);
r_it++;
e_it++;
}
}
BOOST_AUTO_TEST_CASE(util_ParseTorReplyMapping)
{
// Data we should receive during normal usage
CheckParseTorReplyMapping(
"METHODS=COOKIE,SAFECOOKIE COOKIEFILE=\"/home/x/.tor/control_auth_cookie\"", {
{"METHODS", "COOKIE,SAFECOOKIE"},
{"COOKIEFILE", "/home/x/.tor/control_auth_cookie"},
});
CheckParseTorReplyMapping(
"METHODS=NULL", {
{"METHODS", "NULL"},
});
CheckParseTorReplyMapping(
"METHODS=HASHEDPASSWORD", {
{"METHODS", "HASHEDPASSWORD"},
});
CheckParseTorReplyMapping(
"Tor=\"0.2.9.8 (git-a0df013ea241b026)\"", {
{"Tor", "0.2.9.8 (git-a0df013ea241b026)"},
});
CheckParseTorReplyMapping(
"SERVERHASH=aaaa SERVERNONCE=bbbb", {
{"SERVERHASH", "aaaa"},
{"SERVERNONCE", "bbbb"},
});
CheckParseTorReplyMapping(
"ServiceID=exampleonion1234", {
{"ServiceID", "exampleonion1234"},
});
CheckParseTorReplyMapping(
"PrivateKey=RSA1024:BLOB", {
{"PrivateKey", "RSA1024:BLOB"},
});
CheckParseTorReplyMapping(
"ClientAuth=bob:BLOB", {
{"ClientAuth", "bob:BLOB"},
});
// Other valid inputs
CheckParseTorReplyMapping(
"Foo=Bar=Baz Spam=Eggs", {
{"Foo", "Bar=Baz"},
{"Spam", "Eggs"},
});
CheckParseTorReplyMapping(
"Foo=\"Bar=Baz\"", {
{"Foo", "Bar=Baz"},
});
CheckParseTorReplyMapping(
"Foo=\"Bar Baz\"", {
{"Foo", "Bar Baz"},
});
// Escapes (which are left escaped by the parser)
CheckParseTorReplyMapping(
"Foo=\"Bar\\ Baz\"", {
{"Foo", "Bar\\ Baz"},
});
CheckParseTorReplyMapping(
"Foo=\"Bar\\Baz\"", {
{"Foo", "Bar\\Baz"},
});
CheckParseTorReplyMapping(
"Foo=\"Bar\\@Baz\"", {
{"Foo", "Bar\\@Baz"},
});
CheckParseTorReplyMapping(
"Foo=\"Bar\\\"Baz\" Spam=\"\\\"Eggs\\\"\"", {
{"Foo", "Bar\\\"Baz"},
{"Spam", "\\\"Eggs\\\""},
});
CheckParseTorReplyMapping(
"Foo=\"Bar\\\\Baz\"", {
{"Foo", "Bar\\\\Baz"},
});
// A more complex valid grammar. PROTOCOLINFO accepts a VersionLine that
// takes a key=value pair followed by an OptArguments, making this valid.
// Because an OptArguments contains no semantic data, there is no point in
// parsing it.
CheckParseTorReplyMapping(
"SOME=args,here MORE optional=arguments here", {
{"SOME", "args,here"},
});
// Inputs that are effectively invalid under the target grammar.
// PROTOCOLINFO accepts an OtherLine that is just an OptArguments, which
// would make these inputs valid. However,
// - This parser is never used in that situation, because the
// SplitTorReplyLine parser enables OtherLine to be skipped.
// - Even if these were valid, an OptArguments contains no semantic data,
// so there is no point in parsing it.
CheckParseTorReplyMapping("ARGS", {});
CheckParseTorReplyMapping("MORE ARGS", {});
CheckParseTorReplyMapping("MORE ARGS", {});
CheckParseTorReplyMapping("EVEN more=ARGS", {});
CheckParseTorReplyMapping("EVEN+more ARGS", {});
}
BOOST_AUTO_TEST_SUITE_END()

726
src/torcontrol.cpp

@ -0,0 +1,726 @@
#include "torcontrol.h"
#include "utilstrencodings.h"
#include "net.h"
#include "util.h"
#include "crypto/hmac_sha256.h"
#include <vector>
#include <deque>
#include <set>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <boost/function.hpp>
#include <boost/bind.hpp>
#include <boost/signals2/signal.hpp>
#include <boost/foreach.hpp>
#include <boost/algorithm/string/predicate.hpp>
#include <boost/algorithm/string/split.hpp>
#include <boost/algorithm/string/classification.hpp>
#include <boost/algorithm/string/replace.hpp>
#include <event2/bufferevent.h>
#include <event2/buffer.h>
#include <event2/util.h>
#include <event2/event.h>
#include <event2/thread.h>
/** Default control port */
const std::string DEFAULT_TOR_CONTROL = "127.0.0.1:9051";
/** Tor cookie size (from control-spec.txt) */
static const int TOR_COOKIE_SIZE = 32;
/** Size of client/server nonce for SAFECOOKIE */
static const int TOR_NONCE_SIZE = 32;
/** For computing serverHash in SAFECOOKIE */
static const std::string TOR_SAFE_SERVERKEY = "Tor safe cookie authentication server-to-controller hash";
/** For computing clientHash in SAFECOOKIE */
static const std::string TOR_SAFE_CLIENTKEY = "Tor safe cookie authentication controller-to-server hash";
/** Exponential backoff configuration - initial timeout in seconds */
static const float RECONNECT_TIMEOUT_START = 1.0;
/** Exponential backoff configuration - growth factor */
static const float RECONNECT_TIMEOUT_EXP = 1.5;
/** Maximum length for lines received on TorControlConnection.
* tor-control-spec.txt mentions that there is explicitly no limit defined to line length,
* this is belt-and-suspenders sanity limit to prevent memory exhaustion.
*/
static const int MAX_LINE_LENGTH = 100000;
/****** Low-level TorControlConnection ********/
/** Reply from Tor, can be single or multi-line */
class TorControlReply
{
public:
TorControlReply() { Clear(); }
int code;
std::vector<std::string> lines;
void Clear()
{
code = 0;
lines.clear();
}
};
/** Low-level handling for Tor control connection.
* Speaks the SMTP-like protocol as defined in torspec/control-spec.txt
*/
class TorControlConnection
{
public:
typedef boost::function<void(TorControlConnection&)> ConnectionCB;
typedef boost::function<void(TorControlConnection &,const TorControlReply &)> ReplyHandlerCB;
/** Create a new TorControlConnection.
*/
TorControlConnection(struct event_base *base);
~TorControlConnection();
/**
* Connect to a Tor control port.
* target is address of the form host:port.
* connected is the handler that is called when connection is successfully established.
* disconnected is a handler that is called when the connection is broken.
* Return true on success.
*/
bool Connect(const std::string &target, const ConnectionCB& connected, const ConnectionCB& disconnected);
/**
* Disconnect from Tor control port.
*/
bool Disconnect();
/** Send a command, register a handler for the reply.
* A trailing CRLF is automatically added.
* Return true on success.
*/
bool Command(const std::string &cmd, const ReplyHandlerCB& reply_handler);
/** Response handlers for async replies */
boost::signals2::signal<void(TorControlConnection &,const TorControlReply &)> async_handler;
private:
/** Callback when ready for use */
boost::function<void(TorControlConnection&)> connected;
/** Callback when connection lost */
boost::function<void(TorControlConnection&)> disconnected;
/** Libevent event base */
struct event_base *base;
/** Connection to control socket */
struct bufferevent *b_conn;
/** Message being received */
TorControlReply message;
/** Response handlers */
std::deque<ReplyHandlerCB> reply_handlers;
/** Libevent handlers: internal */
static void readcb(struct bufferevent *bev, void *ctx);
static void eventcb(struct bufferevent *bev, short what, void *ctx);
};
TorControlConnection::TorControlConnection(struct event_base *base):
base(base), b_conn(0)
{
}
TorControlConnection::~TorControlConnection()
{
if (b_conn)
bufferevent_free(b_conn);
}
void TorControlConnection::readcb(struct bufferevent *bev, void *ctx)
{
TorControlConnection *self = (TorControlConnection*)ctx;
struct evbuffer *input = bufferevent_get_input(bev);
size_t n_read_out = 0;
char *line;
assert(input);
// If there is not a whole line to read, evbuffer_readln returns NULL
while((line = evbuffer_readln(input, &n_read_out, EVBUFFER_EOL_CRLF)) != NULL)
{
std::string s(line, n_read_out);
free(line);
if (s.size() < 4) // Short line
continue;
// <status>(-|+| )<data><CRLF>
self->message.code = atoi(s.substr(0,3));
self->message.lines.push_back(s.substr(4));
char ch = s[3]; // '-','+' or ' '
if (ch == ' ') {
// Final line, dispatch reply and clean up
if (self->message.code >= 600) {
// Dispatch async notifications to async handler
// Synchronous and asynchronous messages are never interleaved
self->async_handler(*self, self->message);
} else {
if (!self->reply_handlers.empty()) {
// Invoke reply handler with message
self->reply_handlers.front()(*self, self->message);
self->reply_handlers.pop_front();
} else {
LogPrint("tor", "tor: Received unexpected sync reply %i\n", self->message.code);
}
}
self->message.Clear();
}
}
// Check for size of buffer - protect against memory exhaustion with very long lines
// Do this after evbuffer_readln to make sure all full lines have been
// removed from the buffer. Everything left is an incomplete line.
if (evbuffer_get_length(input) > MAX_LINE_LENGTH) {
LogPrintf("tor: Disconnecting because MAX_LINE_LENGTH exceeded\n");
self->Disconnect();
}
}
void TorControlConnection::eventcb(struct bufferevent *bev, short what, void *ctx)
{
TorControlConnection *self = (TorControlConnection*)ctx;
if (what & BEV_EVENT_CONNECTED) {
LogPrint("tor", "tor: Successfully connected!\n");
self->connected(*self);
} else if (what & (BEV_EVENT_EOF|BEV_EVENT_ERROR)) {
if (what & BEV_EVENT_ERROR)
LogPrint("tor", "tor: Error connecting to Tor control socket\n");
else
LogPrint("tor", "tor: End of stream\n");
self->Disconnect();
self->disconnected(*self);
}
}
bool TorControlConnection::Connect(const std::string &target, const ConnectionCB& connected, const ConnectionCB& disconnected)
{
if (b_conn)
Disconnect();
// Parse target address:port
struct sockaddr_storage connect_to_addr;
int connect_to_addrlen = sizeof(connect_to_addr);
if (evutil_parse_sockaddr_port(target.c_str(),
(struct sockaddr*)&connect_to_addr, &connect_to_addrlen)<0) {
LogPrintf("tor: Error parsing socket address %s\n", target);
return false;
}
// Create a new socket, set up callbacks and enable notification bits
b_conn = bufferevent_socket_new(base, -1, BEV_OPT_CLOSE_ON_FREE);
if (!b_conn)
return false;
bufferevent_setcb(b_conn, TorControlConnection::readcb, NULL, TorControlConnection::eventcb, this);
bufferevent_enable(b_conn, EV_READ|EV_WRITE);
this->connected = connected;
this->disconnected = disconnected;
// Finally, connect to target
if (bufferevent_socket_connect(b_conn, (struct sockaddr*)&connect_to_addr, connect_to_addrlen) < 0) {
LogPrintf("tor: Error connecting to address %s\n", target);
return false;
}
return true;
}
bool TorControlConnection::Disconnect()
{
if (b_conn)
bufferevent_free(b_conn);
b_conn = 0;
return true;
}
bool TorControlConnection::Command(const std::string &cmd, const ReplyHandlerCB& reply_handler)
{
if (!b_conn)
return false;
struct evbuffer *buf = bufferevent_get_output(b_conn);
if (!buf)
return false;
evbuffer_add(buf, cmd.data(), cmd.size());
evbuffer_add(buf, "\r\n", 2);
reply_handlers.push_back(reply_handler);
return true;
}
/****** General parsing utilities ********/
/* Split reply line in the form 'AUTH METHODS=...' into a type
* 'AUTH' and arguments 'METHODS=...'.
* Grammar is implicitly defined in https://spec.torproject.org/control-spec by
* the server reply formats for PROTOCOLINFO (S3.21) and AUTHCHALLENGE (S3.24).
*/
static std::pair<std::string,std::string> SplitTorReplyLine(const std::string &s)
{
size_t ptr=0;
std::string type;
while (ptr < s.size() && s[ptr] != ' ') {
type.push_back(s[ptr]);
++ptr;
}
if (ptr < s.size())
++ptr; // skip ' '
return make_pair(type, s.substr(ptr));
}
/** Parse reply arguments in the form 'METHODS=COOKIE,SAFECOOKIE COOKIEFILE=".../control_auth_cookie"'.
* Returns a map of keys to values, or an empty map if there was an error.
* Grammar is implicitly defined in https://spec.torproject.org/control-spec by
* the server reply formats for PROTOCOLINFO (S3.21), AUTHCHALLENGE (S3.24),
* and ADD_ONION (S3.27). See also sections 2.1 and 2.3.
*/
static std::map<std::string,std::string> ParseTorReplyMapping(const std::string &s)
{
std::map<std::string,std::string> mapping;
size_t ptr=0;
while (ptr < s.size()) {
std::string key, value;
while (ptr < s.size() && s[ptr] != '=' && s[ptr] != ' ') {
key.push_back(s[ptr]);
++ptr;
}
if (ptr == s.size()) // unexpected end of line
return std::map<std::string,std::string>();
if (s[ptr] == ' ') // The remaining string is an OptArguments
break;
++ptr; // skip '='
if (ptr < s.size() && s[ptr] == '"') { // Quoted string
++ptr; // skip opening '"'
bool escape_next = false;
while (ptr < s.size() && (escape_next || s[ptr] != '"')) {
escape_next = (s[ptr] == '\\');
value.push_back(s[ptr]);
++ptr;
}
if (ptr == s.size()) // unexpected end of line
return std::map<std::string,std::string>();
++ptr; // skip closing '"'
/* TODO: unescape value - according to the spec this depends on the
* context, some strings use C-LogPrintf style escape codes, some
* don't. So may be better handled at the call site.
*/
} else { // Unquoted value. Note that values can contain '=' at will, just no spaces
while (ptr < s.size() && s[ptr] != ' ') {
value.push_back(s[ptr]);
++ptr;
}
}
if (ptr < s.size() && s[ptr] == ' ')
++ptr; // skip ' ' after key=value
mapping[key] = value;
}
return mapping;
}
/** Read full contents of a file and return them in a std::string.
* Returns a pair <status, string>.
* If an error occured, status will be false, otherwise status will be true and the data will be returned in string.
*
* @param maxsize Puts a maximum size limit on the file that is read. If the file is larger than this, truncated data
* (with len > maxsize) will be returned.
*/
static std::pair<bool,std::string> ReadBinaryFile(const std::string &filename, size_t maxsize=std::numeric_limits<size_t>::max())
{
FILE *f = fopen(filename.c_str(), "rb");
if (f == NULL)
return std::make_pair(false,"");
std::string retval;
char buffer[128];
size_t n;
while ((n=fread(buffer, 1, sizeof(buffer), f)) > 0) {
// Check for reading errors so we don't return any data if we couldn't
// read the entire file (or up to maxsize)
if (ferror(f))
return std::make_pair(false,"");
retval.append(buffer, buffer+n);
if (retval.size() > maxsize)
break;
}
fclose(f);
return std::make_pair(true,retval);
}
/** Write contents of std::string to a file.
* @return true on success.
*/
static bool WriteBinaryFile(const std::string &filename, const std::string &data)
{
FILE *f = fopen(filename.c_str(), "wb");
if (f == NULL)
return false;
if (fwrite(data.data(), 1, data.size(), f) != data.size()) {
fclose(f);
return false;
}
fclose(f);
return true;
}
/****** Bitcoin specific TorController implementation ********/
/** Controller that connects to Tor control socket, authenticate, then create
* and maintain a ephemeral hidden service.
*/
class TorController
{
public:
TorController(struct event_base* base, const std::string& target);
~TorController();
/** Get name fo file to store private key in */
std::string GetPrivateKeyFile();
/** Reconnect, after getting disconnected */
void Reconnect();
private:
struct event_base* base;
std::string target;
TorControlConnection conn;
std::string private_key;
std::string service_id;
bool reconnect;
struct event *reconnect_ev;
float reconnect_timeout;
CService service;
/** Cooie for SAFECOOKIE auth */
std::vector<uint8_t> cookie;
/** ClientNonce for SAFECOOKIE auth */
std::vector<uint8_t> clientNonce;
/** Callback for ADD_ONION result */
void add_onion_cb(TorControlConnection& conn, const TorControlReply& reply);
/** Callback for AUTHENTICATE result */
void auth_cb(TorControlConnection& conn, const TorControlReply& reply);
/** Callback for AUTHCHALLENGE result */
void authchallenge_cb(TorControlConnection& conn, const TorControlReply& reply);
/** Callback for PROTOCOLINFO result */
void protocolinfo_cb(TorControlConnection& conn, const TorControlReply& reply);
/** Callback after successful connection */
void connected_cb(TorControlConnection& conn);
/** Callback after connection lost or failed connection attempt */
void disconnected_cb(TorControlConnection& conn);
/** Callback for reconnect timer */
static void reconnect_cb(evutil_socket_t fd, short what, void *arg);
};
TorController::TorController(struct event_base* baseIn, const std::string& target):
base(baseIn),
target(target), conn(base), reconnect(true), reconnect_ev(0),
reconnect_timeout(RECONNECT_TIMEOUT_START)
{
reconnect_ev = event_new(base, -1, 0, reconnect_cb, this);
if (!reconnect_ev)
LogPrintf("tor: Failed to create event for reconnection: out of memory?\n");
// Start connection attempts immediately
if (!conn.Connect(target, boost::bind(&TorController::connected_cb, this, _1),
boost::bind(&TorController::disconnected_cb, this, _1) )) {
LogPrintf("tor: Initiating connection to Tor control port %s failed\n", target);
}
// Read service private key if cached
std::pair<bool,std::string> pkf = ReadBinaryFile(GetPrivateKeyFile());
if (pkf.first) {
LogPrint("tor", "tor: Reading cached private key from %s\n", GetPrivateKeyFile());
private_key = pkf.second;
}
}
TorController::~TorController()
{
if (reconnect_ev) {
event_free(reconnect_ev);
reconnect_ev = 0;
}
if (service.IsValid()) {
RemoveLocal(service);
}
}
void TorController::add_onion_cb(TorControlConnection& conn, const TorControlReply& reply)
{
if (reply.code == 250) {
LogPrint("tor", "tor: ADD_ONION successful\n");
BOOST_FOREACH(const std::string &s, reply.lines) {
std::map<std::string,std::string> m = ParseTorReplyMapping(s);
std::map<std::string,std::string>::iterator i;
if ((i = m.find("ServiceID")) != m.end())
service_id = i->second;
if ((i = m.find("PrivateKey")) != m.end())
private_key = i->second;
}
if (service_id.empty()) {
LogPrintf("tor: Error parsing ADD_ONION parameters:\n");
for (const std::string &s : reply.lines) {
LogPrintf(" %s\n", SanitizeString(s));
}
return;
}
service = CService(service_id+".onion", GetListenPort(), false);
LogPrintf("tor: Got service ID %s, advertizing service %s\n", service_id, service.ToString());
if (WriteBinaryFile(GetPrivateKeyFile(), private_key)) {
LogPrint("tor", "tor: Cached service private key to %s\n", GetPrivateKeyFile());
} else {
LogPrintf("tor: Error writing service private key to %s\n", GetPrivateKeyFile());
}
AddLocal(service, LOCAL_MANUAL);
// ... onion requested - keep connection open
} else if (reply.code == 510) { // 510 Unrecognized command
LogPrintf("tor: Add onion failed with unrecognized command (You probably need to upgrade Tor)\n");
} else {
LogPrintf("tor: Add onion failed; error code %d\n", reply.code);
}
}
void TorController::auth_cb(TorControlConnection& conn, const TorControlReply& reply)
{
if (reply.code == 250) {
LogPrint("tor", "tor: Authentication successful\n");
// Now that we know Tor is running setup the proxy for onion addresses
// if -onion isn't set to something else.
if (GetArg("-onion", "") == "") {
proxyType addrOnion = proxyType(CService("127.0.0.1", 9050), true);
SetProxy(NET_TOR, addrOnion);
SetLimited(NET_TOR, false);
}
// Finally - now create the service
if (private_key.empty()) // No private key, generate one
private_key = "NEW:RSA1024"; // Explicitly request RSA1024 - see issue #9214
// Request hidden service, redirect port.
// Note that the 'virtual' port doesn't have to be the same as our internal port, but this is just a convenient
// choice. TODO; refactor the shutdown sequence some day.
conn.Command(strprintf("ADD_ONION %s Port=%i,127.0.0.1:%i", private_key, GetListenPort(), GetListenPort()),
boost::bind(&TorController::add_onion_cb, this, _1, _2));
} else {
LogPrintf("tor: Authentication failed\n");
}
}
/** Compute Tor SAFECOOKIE response.
*
* ServerHash is computed as:
* HMAC-SHA256("Tor safe cookie authentication server-to-controller hash",
* CookieString | ClientNonce | ServerNonce)
* (with the HMAC key as its first argument)
*
* After a controller sends a successful AUTHCHALLENGE command, the
* next command sent on the connection must be an AUTHENTICATE command,
* and the only authentication string which that AUTHENTICATE command
* will accept is:
*
* HMAC-SHA256("Tor safe cookie authentication controller-to-server hash",
* CookieString | ClientNonce | ServerNonce)
*
*/
static std::vector<uint8_t> ComputeResponse(const std::string &key, const std::vector<uint8_t> &cookie, const std::vector<uint8_t> &clientNonce, const std::vector<uint8_t> &serverNonce)
{
CHMAC_SHA256 computeHash((const uint8_t*)key.data(), key.size());
std::vector<uint8_t> computedHash(CHMAC_SHA256::OUTPUT_SIZE, 0);
computeHash.Write(begin_ptr(cookie), cookie.size());
computeHash.Write(begin_ptr(clientNonce), clientNonce.size());
computeHash.Write(begin_ptr(serverNonce), serverNonce.size());
computeHash.Finalize(begin_ptr(computedHash));
return computedHash;
}
void TorController::authchallenge_cb(TorControlConnection& conn, const TorControlReply& reply)
{
if (reply.code == 250) {
LogPrint("tor", "tor: SAFECOOKIE authentication challenge successful\n");
std::pair<std::string,std::string> l = SplitTorReplyLine(reply.lines[0]);
if (l.first == "AUTHCHALLENGE") {
std::map<std::string,std::string> m = ParseTorReplyMapping(l.second);
if (m.empty()) {
LogPrintf("tor: Error parsing AUTHCHALLENGE parameters: %s\n", SanitizeString(l.second));
return;
}
std::vector<uint8_t> serverHash = ParseHex(m["SERVERHASH"]);
std::vector<uint8_t> serverNonce = ParseHex(m["SERVERNONCE"]);
LogPrint("tor", "tor: AUTHCHALLENGE ServerHash %s ServerNonce %s\n", HexStr(serverHash), HexStr(serverNonce));
if (serverNonce.size() != 32) {
LogPrintf("tor: ServerNonce is not 32 bytes, as required by spec\n");
return;
}
std::vector<uint8_t> computedServerHash = ComputeResponse(TOR_SAFE_SERVERKEY, cookie, clientNonce, serverNonce);
if (computedServerHash != serverHash) {
LogPrintf("tor: ServerHash %s does not match expected ServerHash %s\n", HexStr(serverHash), HexStr(computedServerHash));
return;
}
std::vector<uint8_t> computedClientHash = ComputeResponse(TOR_SAFE_CLIENTKEY, cookie, clientNonce, serverNonce);
conn.Command("AUTHENTICATE " + HexStr(computedClientHash), boost::bind(&TorController::auth_cb, this, _1, _2));
} else {
LogPrintf("tor: Invalid reply to AUTHCHALLENGE\n");
}
} else {
LogPrintf("tor: SAFECOOKIE authentication challenge failed\n");
}
}
void TorController::protocolinfo_cb(TorControlConnection& conn, const TorControlReply& reply)
{
if (reply.code == 250) {
std::set<std::string> methods;
std::string cookiefile;
/*
* 250-AUTH METHODS=COOKIE,SAFECOOKIE COOKIEFILE="/home/x/.tor/control_auth_cookie"
* 250-AUTH METHODS=NULL
* 250-AUTH METHODS=HASHEDPASSWORD
*/
BOOST_FOREACH(const std::string &s, reply.lines) {
std::pair<std::string,std::string> l = SplitTorReplyLine(s);
if (l.first == "AUTH") {
std::map<std::string,std::string> m = ParseTorReplyMapping(l.second);
std::map<std::string,std::string>::iterator i;
if ((i = m.find("METHODS")) != m.end())
boost::split(methods, i->second, boost::is_any_of(","));
if ((i = m.find("COOKIEFILE")) != m.end())
cookiefile = i->second;
} else if (l.first == "VERSION") {
std::map<std::string,std::string> m = ParseTorReplyMapping(l.second);
std::map<std::string,std::string>::iterator i;
if ((i = m.find("Tor")) != m.end()) {
LogPrint("tor", "tor: Connected to Tor version %s\n", i->second);
}
}
}
BOOST_FOREACH(const std::string &s, methods) {
LogPrint("tor", "tor: Supported authentication method: %s\n", s);
}
// Prefer NULL, otherwise SAFECOOKIE. If a password is provided, use HASHEDPASSWORD
/* Authentication:
* cookie: hex-encoded ~/.tor/control_auth_cookie
* password: "password"
*/
std::string torpassword = GetArg("-torpassword", "");
if (!torpassword.empty()) {
if (methods.count("HASHEDPASSWORD")) {
LogPrint("tor", "tor: Using HASHEDPASSWORD authentication\n");
boost::replace_all(torpassword, "\"", "\\\"");
conn.Command("AUTHENTICATE \"" + torpassword + "\"", boost::bind(&TorController::auth_cb, this, _1, _2));
} else {
LogPrintf("tor: Password provided with -torpassword, but HASHEDPASSWORD authentication is not available\n");
}
} else if (methods.count("NULL")) {
LogPrint("tor", "tor: Using NULL authentication\n");
conn.Command("AUTHENTICATE", boost::bind(&TorController::auth_cb, this, _1, _2));
} else if (methods.count("SAFECOOKIE")) {
// Cookie: hexdump -e '32/1 "%02x""\n"' ~/.tor/control_auth_cookie
LogPrint("tor", "tor: Using SAFECOOKIE authentication, reading cookie authentication from %s\n", cookiefile);
std::pair<bool,std::string> status_cookie = ReadBinaryFile(cookiefile, TOR_COOKIE_SIZE);
if (status_cookie.first && status_cookie.second.size() == TOR_COOKIE_SIZE) {
// conn.Command("AUTHENTICATE " + HexStr(status_cookie.second), boost::bind(&TorController::auth_cb, this, _1, _2));
cookie = std::vector<uint8_t>(status_cookie.second.begin(), status_cookie.second.end());
clientNonce = std::vector<uint8_t>(TOR_NONCE_SIZE, 0);
GetRandBytes(&clientNonce[0], TOR_NONCE_SIZE);
conn.Command("AUTHCHALLENGE SAFECOOKIE " + HexStr(clientNonce), boost::bind(&TorController::authchallenge_cb, this, _1, _2));
} else {
if (status_cookie.first) {
LogPrintf("tor: Authentication cookie %s is not exactly %i bytes, as is required by the spec\n", cookiefile, TOR_COOKIE_SIZE);
} else {
LogPrintf("tor: Authentication cookie %s could not be opened (check permissions)\n", cookiefile);
}
}
} else if (methods.count("HASHEDPASSWORD")) {
LogPrintf("tor: The only supported authentication mechanism left is password, but no password provided with -torpassword\n");
} else {
LogPrintf("tor: No supported authentication method\n");
}
} else {
LogPrintf("tor: Requesting protocol info failed\n");
}
}
void TorController::connected_cb(TorControlConnection& conn)
{
reconnect_timeout = RECONNECT_TIMEOUT_START;
// First send a PROTOCOLINFO command to figure out what authentication is expected
if (!conn.Command("PROTOCOLINFO 1", boost::bind(&TorController::protocolinfo_cb, this, _1, _2)))
LogPrintf("tor: Error sending initial protocolinfo command\n");
}
void TorController::disconnected_cb(TorControlConnection& conn)
{
// Stop advertizing service when disconnected
if (service.IsValid())
RemoveLocal(service);
service = CService();
if (!reconnect)
return;
LogPrint("tor", "tor: Not connected to Tor control port %s, trying to reconnect\n", target);
// Single-shot timer for reconnect. Use exponential backoff.
struct timeval time = MillisToTimeval(int64_t(reconnect_timeout * 1000.0));
if (reconnect_ev)
event_add(reconnect_ev, &time);
reconnect_timeout *= RECONNECT_TIMEOUT_EXP;
}
void TorController::Reconnect()
{
/* Try to reconnect and reestablish if we get booted - for example, Tor
* may be restarting.
*/
if (!conn.Connect(target, boost::bind(&TorController::connected_cb, this, _1),
boost::bind(&TorController::disconnected_cb, this, _1) )) {
LogPrintf("tor: Re-initiating connection to Tor control port %s failed\n", target);
}
}
std::string TorController::GetPrivateKeyFile()
{
return (GetDataDir() / "onion_private_key").string();
}
void TorController::reconnect_cb(evutil_socket_t fd, short what, void *arg)
{
TorController *self = (TorController*)arg;
self->Reconnect();
}
/****** Thread ********/
static struct event_base *gBase;
static boost::thread torControlThread;
static void TorControlThread()
{
TorController ctrl(gBase, GetArg("-torcontrol", DEFAULT_TOR_CONTROL));
event_base_dispatch(gBase);
}
void StartTorControl(boost::thread_group& threadGroup, CScheduler& scheduler)
{
assert(!gBase);
#ifdef WIN32
evthread_use_windows_threads();
#else
evthread_use_pthreads();
#endif
gBase = event_base_new();
if (!gBase) {
LogPrintf("tor: Unable to create event_base\n");
return;
}
torControlThread = boost::thread(boost::bind(&TraceThread<void (*)()>, "torcontrol", &TorControlThread));
}
void InterruptTorControl()
{
if (gBase) {
LogPrintf("tor: Thread interrupt\n");
event_base_loopbreak(gBase);
}
}
void StopTorControl()
{
if (gBase) {
torControlThread.join();
event_base_free(gBase);
gBase = 0;
}
}

20
src/torcontrol.h

@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
// Copyright (c) 2015 The Bitcoin Core developers
// Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying
// file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.
/**
* Functionality for communicating with Tor.
*/
#ifndef BITCOIN_TORCONTROL_H
#define BITCOIN_TORCONTROL_H
#include "scheduler.h"
extern const std::string DEFAULT_TOR_CONTROL;
static const bool DEFAULT_LISTEN_ONION = true;
void StartTorControl(boost::thread_group& threadGroup, CScheduler& scheduler);
void InterruptTorControl();
void StopTorControl();
#endif /* BITCOIN_TORCONTROL_H */
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