diff --git a/whitepaper/protocol.pdf b/whitepaper/protocol.pdf
index f807feb..2806b77 100644
Binary files a/whitepaper/protocol.pdf and b/whitepaper/protocol.pdf differ
diff --git a/whitepaper/protocol.tex b/whitepaper/protocol.tex
index a48d504..3f5ae38 100644
--- a/whitepaper/protocol.tex
+++ b/whitepaper/protocol.tex
@@ -180,8 +180,9 @@ electronic commerce and payment, financial privacy, proof of work, zero knowledg
 \newcommand{\ZEN}{\termbf{ZEN}}
 \newcommand{\ZCL}{\termbf{ZCL}}
 \newcommand{\KMD}{\termbf{KMD}}
+\newcommand{\BTCH}{\termbf{BTCH}}
 \newcommand{\BTCP}{\termbf{BTCP}}
-\newcommand{\ZGLD}{\termbf{ZGLD}}
+\newcommand{\ZAU}{\termbf{ZAU}}
 \newcommand{\HUSH}{\termbf{HUSH}}
 \newcommand{\zatoshi}{\term{zatoshi}}
 \newcommand{\puposhi}{\term{puposhi}}
@@ -775,7 +776,7 @@ electronic commerce and payment, financial privacy, proof of work, zero knowledg
 \HushList is a protocol for mailing lists using the encrypted memo
 field of the \Zcash protocol.  It supports anonymous and pseudonymous senders, anonymous receivers and Hushlist creators, as
 well as public and private lists.  The HushList protocol can run on any fork of \Zcash that has a compatible memo field, though certain advanced features might not be fully supported
-on all chains.  HushList is developed and tested on the Hush mainnet and testnets and is designed to run on any \ZEC fork including but not limited to \HUSH, \KMD, \ZCL, \ZEN and the upcoming \BTCP and \ZGLD forks.
+on all chains.  HushList is developed and tested on the Hush mainnet and testnets and is designed to run on any \ZEC code fork including but not limited to \HUSH, \KMD, \ZCL, \ZEN and the upcoming \BTCP and \ZAU forks. HushList is also compatible with Bitcoin Hush \BTCH, which is a \KMD asset chain.
 
 In addition to the above properties, \HushList provides users with censorship-resistant
 storage and retrieval, since every \Hush full node will have an encrypted copy of every
@@ -1133,7 +1134,20 @@ Of course Amanda is free to never reveal her identity and remain a psuedonym ind
 
 Amanda needs to be concerned about her IP address being tied to $ t_A $ by a passive network attacker who records the Internet and is encouraged to use a proxy, Tor or other means depending on risk and operational security needs.
 
-"Oppressed Minority" user story - Francesca and Nicolau
+\nsubsection{Last Will And Testament User Story - Xerxes}
+
+Xerxes would like to store a copy of their Last Will And Testament in multiple secure locations, where they cannot be lost nor destroyed by parties that would benefit
+from the destruction of the Will.
+
+Xerxes can use HushList protocol to store their will in many different blockchains, in the hopes that at least one will survive longer than him, and to prevent
+censorship if he only stored the data on one chain. Xerxes can choose to additionally make the will public initially, or after some time period, or only leave
+instructions for retreiving the will with executors of their Estate.
+
+This use case also supports the continual updating of a Will, and provides a record of all the changes to a will, with timestamps and cryptographic certainty.
+This record can be verified by any and all exectuors, with or without making the records public. Indeed, a public HushList can be used to provide instructions
+and the actual Will, and newer memos to that list are public proof that the person has changed their Will.
+
+\nsubsection{"Oppressed Minority" user story - Francesca and Nicolau}
 
 Francesca and Nicalau live in a place where their local religion/government/organization is oppressed by a larger religion/government/organication that controls everything around them, yet they still want to safely communicate.