@ -186,7 +186,7 @@ TLDR: Worst case is that an attacker steals wallet.dat files and does an immense
At first there was a single Sietch implementation of 200 zaddrs that were fixed. If the wallet.dat owning those zaddrs were stolen, that could be used to delete all the Sietch "privacy dust" from the transaction graph, making the job of blockchain analysts and/or ITM attackers much easier. This theoretical attack is what prompted dynamic Sietch addresses and also a better way of generating zaddrs inside SDL: using BIP39 seed-phrases to generate a single zaddr and then delete the seed phrase. This method leaves no wallet.dat on disk to steal and the private key material for the zaddr only existed in memory a short time.
Currently in production are 200 static zaddrs in `hushd` and 10,000 static (BIP39-derived) zaddrs in `SDL`. The dynamic
Sietch zaddr code for `hushd` is complete and can be viewed here: https://github.com/MyHush/hush3/tree/sietch_dynamic
Sietch zaddr code for `hushd` is complete and can be [viewed here](https://git.hush.is/hush/hush3/src/branch/master/src/sietch.h).
It's currently being performance tested as it does some exotic things.
There is no wallet.dat to steal to recover data about Sietch zoutputs for 10,000 of the 10,200 zaddrs currently in the combined Sietch zaddr pool, so this attack is no longer viable. Dynamic Sietch zaddrs will make the entire process much more secure by preventing analysts/attackers from even knowing the zaddrs that could potentially be a Sietch output. These dynamic Sietch zaddrs will be generated at run-time and private keys never even written to disk, nor part of the `hdseed` of any wallet.dat in the case of `SDL`.
