Explain things a bit better

README.md

@@ -2,31 +2,37 @@
 
 ## What is Sietch?
 
-Sietch is a new set of RPC functionality and consensus rules related to
+Sietch is the codename for a new set of RPC functionality and consensus rules related to
 using shielded funds. Shielded transaction creation is modified above
 the level of the Zcash Protocol itself, no changes to that
-layer are made. This preserves compatibility with all existing Zcash protocol
-ecosystem software.
+layer are made. Additionally, there are no changes at how the RPC layer
+is used, i.e. Sietch is implemented in hushd internals and existing software
+which uses `hush-cli` and/or the RPC interface are not required to change
+in any way. This preserves compatibility with all existing Zcash protocol
+ecosystem software at a very low level.
 
 Sietch defines certain wallet and transction conditions that must be
 upheld for transactions to be accepted by the network as well as making all clients have
-new default behavior that is more privacy-preserving.
+new default behavior that is more privacy-preserving. This involves both
+new wallet behavior that is non-consensus and also new consensus rules.
 
 Sietch does not modify anything about Zcash internals such as zk-SNARKs,
-cryptographic primitives or changing any of the deep math involved, such
-as Elliptic Curves parameters or other deep cryptographic machinery.
+cryptographic primitives or changing any of the deep zero knowledge math involved, such
+as Elliptic Curves parameters or other cryptographic machinery.
 
-Any Zcash Protocol coin could adopt this "upgrade" to plain Zcash Protocol,
+Any Zcash Protocol coin could adopt this "upgrade" to Sietch-enabled Hush Protocol,
 though it should be noted that Hush was the first pure Sapling Zcash Protocol
-coin and so our implementation ignores Sprout JoinSplits, since we thankfully
-have none on our v3 mainnet. Supporting Sprout would not be complex and is
-left as an exercise to the interested privacy coin.
+coin and so our implementation ignores Sprout zaddrs. This is because we thankfully
+have no Sprout zaddrs or transactions on our v3 mainnet.
+Sietch is compatible with older sprout zaddrs and supporting
+it is left as an exercise to the interested privacy coin.
 
 ## How is Sietch implemented?
 
-Sietch is written in C++ and mostly lives inside the hushd full node, which means
-all GUI wallets can benefit from it. Some features in the future
-may b  implemented at the GUI wallet level. The goal is that the user does not need
+Sietch is written in C++ and inside the hushd full node code, which means
+all existing code that interacts with hush can benefit *with no changes*.
+Some optional/advanced features in the future
+may be implemented at the GUI wallet level. The goal is that the user does not need
 to think or do anything different, to have more privacy when
 making transactions.
 
@@ -37,7 +43,8 @@ transaction as they always have, via the same exact RPC methods and parameters.
 From the perspective of the average GUI wallet user, It Just Works.
 There are no additional mandatory steps for the user when sending
 each transaction. No mandatory wallet maintenance will be needed
-to keep their privacy. The same goes for exchanges, mining pools and all Hush users.
+to keep their privacy. No confusing options to "get right" on each transaction.
+The same goes for exchanges, mining pools and all Hush users.
 No changes at all are required by end users to enable Sietch, other than upgrading
 to compatible Hush software.
 
@@ -47,7 +54,12 @@ Hush is dedicated to all future privacy features being defaulted to ON instead
 of asking our users to opt-in to privacy, which we know is a fools errand.
 
 Users will not have to opt-in to Sietch and there will be no way to turn off
-the functionality.
+the functionality. Additionally, Sietch will be enabled on mainet as an opt-in feature
+at first, as a first wave of adoption and for testing. When all Hush users have updated
+to software with Sietch-enabled Hush protocol, a new consensus rule will go into effect
+which will prevent older non-Sietch clients. Additionally, Hush will increase it's
+PROTOCOL\_VERSION with the Sietch feature, which will also allow Sietch-enabled Hush nodes
+to effeciently block potentially malicious non-Sietch hushd clients at the p2p level.
 
 ## What are the goals of Sietch?
 
@@ -55,9 +67,10 @@ the functionality.
  * Allow people to make zaddr xtns safely/privately without thinking about
    metadata leakage or advanced techniques
  * Prevent average users from making some blockchain operations which give out too much metadata
- * Break some assumptions which many blockchain analyst software uses
+ * Break assumptions in blockchain analyst software
  * Require blockchain analysts to write new software
- * Increase the privacy of all funds in the shielded pool
+ * Increase computational cost of current blockchain analysis
+ * Increase the privacy of all funds in the Hush shielded pool
  * Introduce non-determinism to counter ITM/Metaverse style metadata attacks
 
 ## What are the limitations/downsides of Sietch?
@@ -123,7 +136,10 @@ extremely expensive. It limits it to searching for linkability metadata in only
 additional supporting metadata, effectively raising the bar for attack and removing many potential attackers
 who do not have sufficient resources. In pre-Sietch code, the ITM attack can potentially research very long chains,
 dozens, hundreds and perhaps thousands of transactions in length, with commodity hardware.
-Sietch exponenentially increases the cost of doing this, in RAM, CPU and running-time. 
+Sietch exponenentially increases the cost of doing this, in RAM, CPU and running-time. Either an attacker would
+need botnet or supercomputer-level resources to attack the same length chains as pre-Sietch code, or more likely,
+de-anonymizing attackers will focus on studying short linkability chains with a lot of additional metadata from
+timing analysis, amount analysis and potentially passive or active dust attacks.
 
 
 ### Non-determinism
@@ -131,6 +147,6 @@ Sietch exponenentially increases the cost of doing this, in RAM, CPU and running
 
 Combinatorial explosion can only protect us so much. It is only one layer of defense. 
 
-When adding zutxos, to break the ITM/Metaverse metadata attacks at a deep level, we much break a deep assumption
+When adding zutxos, to break the ITM/Metaverse metadata attacks at a deep level, we must break a deep assumption
 that is baked deep into Bitcoin: determinism.