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  1. 4
      README.md
  2. 119
      copyright-infringement.md
  3. 6
      mining/solo-mining.md
  4. 53
      notes.md
  5. 24
      protocol/README.md

4
README.md

@ -69,9 +69,10 @@ If you know what you're doing, and want to setup a server to help the Hush commu
![men doing kung-fu](images/hush-kung-fu.gif)
If you need some Hush kung-fu, then you know what to do!!! **This is not for regular users :)**
If you need some Hush kung-fu, then you know what to do!!! **This is not for GUI wallet users :)**
- RPC documentation: https://faq.hush.is/rpc/
- If you use a hush command-line full node, you can look up the docs for every single RPC at the link above
- [SDL in the RAW](advanced/sdl-in-the-raw.md): this howto is to setup an SDL server locally if your system is unable to access any online
## Support Links
@ -82,6 +83,5 @@ If you need some Hush kung-fu, then you know what to do!!! **This is not for reg
## How to follow Hush
- [Twitter](https://twitter.com/MyHushTeam)
- [Mastodon](https://fosstodon.org/@myhushteam)

119
copyright-infringement.md

@ -0,0 +1,119 @@
# Copyright Infringement of HUSH code
This file exists to document the copyright infringement of HUSH code as clearly as possible
with as much supporting info as possible, so people can decide for themselves. Any project
that infringes on "The Hush Developers" copyright will be listed here. Currently there
is one project that severely infringes the copyright of Hush code, which is Pirate.
## What is Copyright Infringement?
Copyright infringement is when one project takes code from another project, and maliciously
or accidentally changes copyright information and/or mixes code of incompatible copyrights
together. In the case of HUSH, our code is GNU Public License Version 3 (GPLv3), which means
projects that use non-GPL code cannot (legally) take our code and add it to their project,
unless they:
* Change their copyright to GPLv3 (or a higher version)
* Add copyright disclaimers from "The Hush Developers"
## z\_getbalances RPC
Hush wrote a new RPC which does not exist in any other cryptocoin called `z_getbalances` first created on April 13th 2021 in commit
https://github.com/hushmirror/hush3/commit/52e14828c8366d28a47d16acff42f64e988669fe then less than a month later the same exact RPC name, with same functionality was added
in Pirate commit https://github.com/PirateNetwork/pirate/commit/be114569ec692c41b0af5d6ad84e6acf7da6305f . It adds a new optional argument and is a derived work:
https://github.com/hushmirror/hush3/blob/dev/src/wallet/rpcwallet.cpp#L3646
https://github.com/PirateNetwork/pirate/blob/master/src/wallet/rpcwallet.cpp#L4157
## hush-cli was renamed pirate-cli
Very interestingly, in https://github.com/PirateNetwork/pirate/commit/412f5a296165ed7601749383cb4b94a4d8a0a9c5 it can be seen
that the `hush-cli` script was renamed `pirate-cli`, and the Hush copyright line was removed and replaced with a Pirate copyright
that says "no rights reserved" :
```
#!/bin/bash
-# Copyright (c) 2019 Hush developers
+# Copyright (c) 2019 PirateChain - no rights reserved
# set working directory to the location of this script
DIR="$( cd "$( dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}" )" && pwd )"
cd $DIR
-NAME=HUSH3
+NAME=PIRATE
CLI=${KOMODOCLI:-./komodo-cli}
$CLI -ac_name=$NAME "$@"
```
This file no longer exists in their master branch, but is a good example of Pirate blatantly infringing on Hush code copyright.
## TLS Code
Pirate seems to have copied huge sections of the TLS code from Hush, including entire files
and detailed code comments in certain functions, while also not adding our Copyright disclaimer
to their files. Since Pirate is MIT and Hush is GPLv3, mixing this code is incompatible.
For instance: https://github.com/hushmirror/hush3/blob/dev/src/hush/tlsenums.h was created in
commit https://github.com/PirateNetwork/pirate/commit/a21bf4051094a8ca9c481efd32d706361e8003b5
on Oct 31st 2021 but https://github.com/hushmirror/hush3/blob/dev/src/hush/tlsenums.h was
created on Sep 29th 2020 in commit https://github.com/hushmirror/hush3/commit/62f67821ecd801cc26b9f3aa14de8735d6563a0a
The files are almost exactly the same, except Hush Copyright lines have been removed, the namespace
"hush" was changed to "tls" and whitespace has been added. The exact ordering of elements and exact
names of variables is exactly the same.
Another fact is that all the filenames in https://github.com/PirateNetwork/pirate/tree/master/src/tls
are exactly the same as the filenames in https://github.com/hushmirror/hush3/tree/dev/src/hush yet
the Hush files were created over a year prior.
Additionally the function threadSocketHandler at https://github.com/PirateNetwork/pirate/blob/master/src/tls/tlsmanager.cpp#L347
is almost exactly the same. The differences are because Hush uses WolfSSL where Pirate uses OpenSSL and
logging to a different log category ("net" vs "tls") .
The `-tls` CLI option and `-tls=only` argument was added in commit https://github.com/hushmirror/hush3/commit/62f67821ecd801cc26b9f3aa14de8735d6563a0a on Sep 29th 2020
and then appears over a year later in Pirate source code in commit https://github.com/PirateNetwork/pirate/commit/a21bf4051094a8ca9c481efd32d706361e8003b5
Additionally, Hush added the field `tls_connections` to two RPCs: `getinfo` and `getnetworkinfo` and Pirate took this code,
and turned the oneliner to a for loop to make it look different, yet it is still a derived work:
```
pirate/src/rpc/net.cpp
515: " \"tls_connections\": xxxxx, (numeric) the number of TLS connections\n"
557: obj.push_back(Pair("tls_connections", sslNode));
pirate/src/rpc/misc.cpp
212: " \"tls_connections\": xxxxx, (numeric) the number of TLS connections\n"
302: obj.push_back(Pair("tls_connections", sslNode));
hush3/src/rpc/net.cpp
506: " \"tls_connections\": xxxxx, (numeric) the number of TLS connections\n"
541: obj.push_back(Pair("tls_connections", (int)std::count_if(vNodes.begin(), vNodes.end(), [](CNode* n) {return n->ssl != NULL;})));
hush3/src/rpc/misc.cpp
219: " \"tls_connections\": xxxxx, (numeric) the number of encrypted TLS (SSL) connections\n"
293: obj.push_back(Pair("tls_connections", (int)std::count_if(vNodes.begin(), vNodes.end(), [](CNode* n) {return n->ssl != NULL;})));
```
You can also notice they exactly copied the documentation of each RPC, with no changes.
In the file `src/net.h` you can see that Pirate copied the exact variable names of the TLS context objects:
```
pirate/src/net.h
extern SSL_CTX *tls_ctx_server;
extern SSL_CTX *tls_ctx_client;
/hush3/src/net.h
extern SSL_CTX *tls_ctx_server;
extern SSL_CTX *tls_ctx_client;
```
Additionally, these two objects were added at exactly the same place in the file, between the `strSubVersion` and `LocalServiceInfo` struct.
https://github.com/PirateNetwork/pirate/blob/master/src/net.h#L226
https://github.com/hushmirror/hush3/blob/dev/src/net.h#L196

6
mining/solo-mining.md

@ -51,10 +51,12 @@ First we need to setup the Hush configuration on our computer.
1. Next we start the hush daemon (hushd) at the command line with special options to enable a stratum server.
```
./src/hushd -stratum -debug=stratum -stratumallowip=192.168.0.0/16 &> hush-stratum.log
./src/hushd -stratum -stratumallowip=192.168.0.0/16 &> hush-stratum.log
```
Substitute your hushd path and your local network appropriately in the above command.
Substitute your hushd path and your local network appropriately in the above command. If you are renting hashrate and do not know the IP addresses that will connect, you can allow any IP address to connect with `-stratumallowip=0.0.0.0/0` .
If you are having issues you can temporarily add `-debug=stratum` but beware that it will log many lines and you will want to turn it off for normal use.
1. Check that the stratum is started by seeing that it is listening on the correct port (default 19031).

53
notes.md

@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
# Summary
TLDR: ECC profits directly from their own users lack of privacy.
The company behind Zcash, Electric Coin Company, works directly with Law Enforcement and blockchain analysis companies, whose largest customers are Law Enforcement Organizations (LEOs).
This is the Military-Industrial-Surveillance complex, where ECC directly profits from their users lack of privacy
The Hush community finds this to be an egregious conflict-of-interest
What follows are important summaries and quotes from this video:
https://www.bitchute.com/video/PWXU7D4VV0lB/
The video was removed from YouTube and then uncensored by the Monero community
The companies actually make fun of Zcash optional privacy, but say if people use the tech, they can't track it.
It shows that ECC profits directly from their own users lack of privacy.
0:43:45
Ciphertrace and other companies are starting to work with Zcash team at Electric Coin Company on integration
of tools for that blockchain.
-- Dave Jevans, CEO of Ciphertrace
1:00:00 - Summary of Bitcoin ATM usage: stolen CC's, darknet markets, overseas remittance to family members
1:03:24 - Mixers can be wiretapped, Denial-of-Service'd and have code errors, not as good as privacy coins.
1:03:55 - Custody and exit fraud risk of "mixers" are inferior to protocol level privacy. Privacy coins have less risk of theft, almost none
1:04 -
```
We also have projects that are funded by Law Enforcement Organizations,
to work on Monero and Zcash tools and support, so there is good interest
in the research funding side, as well as the investigation side.
- Dave Jevans, CEO of Ciphertrace
```
```
The other thing, we are in touch with some communities and I would say, for example, we are getting a lot of helpful attitude from the Zcash Community, they were able to explain to us how exactly coin anonymization feature worked. Of course, if you have a suspect that knows what he is doing, he is not making stupid mistakes, their community is, of course, not in a position to help.
-- ChainAnalysis
```
* 1:04:20 - What should Law Enforcement Organizations do?
* 1:05:00 - What Should Law Enforcement Do When They See A Privacy Coin?
* Very few options, forensics tools don't help. Monero + Tor is a dead end.
* Seizing phones is the easiest way to de-anonymize privacy coins!
* 1:06:00 - Telling Law Enforcement to search for privacy coin wallets, not just Bitcoin wallets, on seized phones. Wallets can be imported into surveillance software.
Originally from https://gist.github.com/leto/c351124c937e1516e9ac37e86738b0b2

24
protocol/README.md

@ -98,14 +98,17 @@ transactions with high likelihood.
## Defeating "First Timestamp Estimator" (FTE)
The idea of a FTE comes from "Anonymity Properties of the Bitcoin P2P Network" at https://arxiv.org/pdf/1703.08761.pdf by Giulia Fanti and Pramod Viswanath.
We thank Guilia Fanti for their feedback on this section.
Dandelion is one way to try to defeat it, but the internals implementation is complex and can potentially add new attacks, which is why it was never merged
into Bitcoin. Monero does have Dandelion, but attacks such as BADCACA show it is still vulnerable to Sybil Attacks. Dandelion++ is an improvement to Dandelion
that fixes many issues with the original Dandelion algorithm, but so far it seems no cryptocoin fully implements it, likely because of the complexity of how
it changes network and mempool internals.
Hush was motivated by the question "What is the simplest way to defeat the first timestamp estimator?". We also wanted to optimize for very bad conditions,
of Sybil Attacks that run 50-99% of nodes, not small Sybil Attacks when the attacker runs less than half the nodes in the network. Implementing Dandelion
Hush was motivated by the question "What is the simplest way to defeat the first timestamp estimator?". We also wanted to optimize for relatively bad conditions,
of Sybil Attacks that run up to 49% of nodes. Sybil attacks of 50% or more of the network are very powerful and no cryptocoin, to our knowledge, has come up with
a method to protect against them. Implementing Dandelion
requires changing how the mempool works and we also wanted to avoid that, since it's very hard to know if new vulnerabilities are being introduced.
Hush's method to defeat the FTE is choosing a *random subset of peers* at transaction relay time, and only relaying the transaction to those peers.
@ -114,19 +117,22 @@ latency is on the order of seconds, it does not slow down anything noticeable to
down in case of odd numbers. So for instance, if a Hush node has 5 outbound connections, it will relay to a random subset of 2 of them, which is 40%. Rounding down
helps make things harder on the attacker for nodes with small numbers of outbound connections, such as those who have only recently joined the network.
Imagine a scenario where the network is 50% Sybil nodes, which are using the FTE to correlate which nodes created which transactions, i.e. creating
Imagine a scenario where the network is 25% Sybil nodes, which are using the FTE to correlate which nodes created which transactions, i.e. creating
a mapping between IP address and transaction id. With the Hush transaction relay algorithm, it's possible for a Sybil node to be directly connected to the node
making a transaction, yet that node might not relay the transaction to the Sybil node, since that outbound node is not one of the randomly 50% of peers that is chosen
when the transaction is made.
If we assume that 50% of our nodes are Sybil nodes and we only relay our transaction to 50% of our connections, then on average, the FTE will only be correct
25% of the time. As we assume the Sybil Attacker has a larger percentage of network nodes, the FTE will increase in accuracy but never be more than 50% accurate, which is
not very good at all.
If we assume that 25% of our nodes are Sybil nodes and we only relay our transaction to 50% of our connections, then on average, the FTE will only be correct
12.5% of the time. As we assume the Sybil Attacker has a larger percentage of network nodes, the FTE will increase in accuracy but never be more than 50% accurate, unless
it has Sybile nodes which comprise more than 50% of the network.
Nodes with small numbers of connections also do well against the attacker. If a node has only 3 outbound connections and makes a transaction, it will only relay it to 1
node, which is 33%. If we assume a Sybil Attacker with 50% of network nodes, the FTE will only be accurate about 17% of the time in trying to decide which node made the
transaction. In the same situation, a Hush node with 15 connections will result in an FTE with ~23% accuracy.
node, which is 33.3% of it's peers. If we assume a Sybil Attacker with 25% of network nodes, the FTE will only be accurate about `25% * 33% =~ 8.3%` of the time in trying to decide which node made the
transaction. In the same situation, a Hush node with 15 connections will result in an FTE with `25% * 7/15 =~ 11.6%` accuracy.
We note that, as mentioned by Guilia Fanti, if a Sybil Attacker comprises say, 99% of nodes on the network, then they will almost always be one of the peers of every
other node on the network, and the above defense fails.
## Tor P2P Support
Tor v2 was deprecated by the Tor network and they have changed to v3, and Hush is currently in the process of merging Tor v3 support from BTC Core.
Tor v2 was deprecated by the Tor network and they have changed to v3, and Hush is currently in the process of merging Tor v3 support from BTC Core on the `p2p` branch of hush3.git.

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