Luckpool

sietch.bib

@@ -62,6 +62,13 @@
 %    howpublished={Fast software encryption, 2002}
 %}
 
+@misc{LuckPool,
+    author={hellcatz},
+    title={LuckPool},
+    url={https://luckpool.net/hush/},
+    urldate={2020-05-08}
+}
+
 %@inproceedings{fse-2002-3091,
 @misc{COMPLEAK,
   title={Compression and Information Leakage of Plaintext},

sietch.tex

@@ -608,6 +608,12 @@ Similarly for mining pools which support paying out to \zaddr, an attacker can j
 single payout. They will now know one of the zaddrs and the exact amount being paid out in that transaction. Mining
 pools are a wealth of information to de-anonymize \zaddrs and must be very careful to not leak useful metadata.
 
+We would like to mention \cite{LuckPool} as an example of Best Practices by a mining pool that supports \zaddrs,
+they do not list any \zaddr publicly and do not allow searching by \zaddr and do not show which \zaddrs are being
+paid out. The Hush community also reached out to Pirate mining pools long ago and many of them removed public metadata
+about \zaddr miners when their were told the privacy implications. All mining pools which can pay out to \zaddrs
+should follow these guidelines. All public data about \zaddrs can be fed into ITM and Metaverse attacks.
+
 \nsubsection{Timing Analysis}
 
 This analysis uses the heuristic that transactions that are close together are likely to be related, or