forked from jahway603/hush-docs
Duke Leto
2 years ago
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# Summary |
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TLDR: ECC profits directly from their own users lack of privacy. |
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The company behind Zcash, Electric Coin Company, works directly with Law Enforcement and blockchain analysis companies, whose largest customers are Law Enforcement Organizations (LEOs). |
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This is the Military-Industrial-Surveillance complex, where ECC directly profits from their users lack of privacy |
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The Hush community finds this to be an egregious conflict-of-interest |
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What follows are important summaries and quotes from this video: |
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https://www.bitchute.com/video/PWXU7D4VV0lB/ |
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The video was removed from YouTube and then uncensored by the Monero community |
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The companies actually make fun of Zcash optional privacy, but say if people use the tech, they can't track it. |
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It shows that ECC profits directly from their own users lack of privacy. |
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0:43:45 |
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Ciphertrace and other companies are starting to work with Zcash team at Electric Coin Company on integration |
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of tools for that blockchain. |
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-- Dave Jevans, CEO of Ciphertrace |
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1:00:00 - Summary of Bitcoin ATM usage: stolen CC's, darknet markets, overseas remittance to family members |
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1:03:24 - Mixers can be wiretapped, Denial-of-Service'd and have code errors, not as good as privacy coins. |
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1:03:55 - Custody and exit fraud risk of "mixers" are inferior to protocol level privacy. Privacy coins have less risk of theft, almost none |
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1:04 - |
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We also have projects that are funded by Law Enforcement Organizations, |
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to work on Monero and Zcash tools and support, so there is good interest |
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in the research funding side, as well as the investigation side. |
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``` - Dave Jevans, CEO of Ciphertrace |
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The other thing, we are in touch with some communities and I would say, for example, we are getting a lot of helpful attitude from the Zcash Community, they were able to explain to us how exactly coin anonymization feature worked. Of course, if you have a suspect that knows what he is doing, he is not making stupid mistakes, their community is, of course, not in a position to help. |
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-- ChainAnalysis |
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* 1:04:20 - What should Law Enforcement Organizations do? |
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* 1:05:00 - What Should Law Enforcement Do When They See A Privacy Coin? |
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* Very few options, forensics tools don't help. Monero + Tor is a dead end. |
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* Seizing phones is the easiest way to de-anonymize privacy coins! |
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* 1:06:00 - Telling Law Enforcement to search for privacy coin wallets, not just Bitcoin wallets, on seized phones. |
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Wallets can be imported into surveillance software. |
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Originally from https://gist.github.com/leto/c351124c937e1516e9ac37e86738b0b2 |
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