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@ -442,10 +442,10 @@ electronic commerce and payment, financial privacy, proof of work, zero knowledg |
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\normalsize \noindent \textbf{Abstract.} |
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\normalsize \noindent \textbf{Abstract.} |
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\Hush originally was a source code fork of the \Zcash 1.0.8 codebase. Hush was |
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\Hush originally was a source code fork of the \Zcash 1.0.8 codebase. Hush was |
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originally called "Zdash" and mined a genesis block on Nov 17, 2016. |
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originally called "Zdash" and mined a genesis block on Nov 17, 2016. The |
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The latest version of \Hush migrates to a new codebase with a new genesis |
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latest version of \Hush migrates to a new codebase based on Komodo and Zcash |
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block while keeping the emission schedule as close as possible to the original |
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2.0.x with a new genesis block while keeping the emission schedule as close |
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intentions |
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as possible to the original intentions. |
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\vspace{2.5ex} |
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\vspace{2.5ex} |
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\noindent \textbf{Keywords:}~ \StrSubstitute[0]{\keywords}{,}{, }. |
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\noindent \textbf{Keywords:}~ \StrSubstitute[0]{\keywords}{,}{, }. |
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@ -653,7 +653,12 @@ HUSH will continue to have Delayed Proof-of-Work as protection against 51\% |
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attacks and double spend attack prevention. No other technology is proven |
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attacks and double spend attack prevention. No other technology is proven |
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in production like DPoW. |
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in production like DPoW. |
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The current implementation of DPoW in Hush v2 was tested in a test attack. A |
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The first DPoW transaction occured at Apr 14, 2019 10:38:10 PM Eastern Time |
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on the new HUSH mainnet : |
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https://explorer.myhush.org/tx/e73105092bbf01694af250f8ef89aa38d955856a5a3496e3336eaca59492b29f |
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The current implementation of DPoW in Hush v2 was tested in a test attack. A |
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large amount of hashrate was rented at NiceHash, and a 51\% attack was |
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large amount of hashrate was rented at NiceHash, and a 51\% attack was |
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attempted, which would re-organized a notarized block. The attack repeatedly |
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attempted, which would re-organized a notarized block. The attack repeatedly |
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failed and wasted a large amount of BTC of the simulated attacker. |
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failed and wasted a large amount of BTC of the simulated attacker. |
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@ -678,13 +683,17 @@ being a reorganization of: |
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\begin{quote} |
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\begin{quote} |
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At Fri, 21 Sep 2018 07:00:50 GMT the subchain |
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At Fri, 21 Sep 2018 07:00:50 GMT the 46 block subchain: |
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00000009abdccd07615216765b17f99fbfc50e4106efe7bee2e4ca22810b0fa3.. |
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00000009abdccd07615216765b17f99fbfc50e4106efe7bee2e4ca22810b0fa3.. |
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000000028afb1daccbd0ac17d8685deeb0d072fdc5d4609209dd68675f873611 (46 blocks) |
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was orphaned and replaced by |
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000000028afb1daccbd0ac17d8685deeb0d072fdc5d4609209dd68675f873611 |
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was orphaned and replaced by the 45 block subchain: |
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00000009abdccd07615216765b17f99fbfc50e4106efe7bee2e4ca22810b0fa3.. |
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00000009abdccd07615216765b17f99fbfc50e4106efe7bee2e4ca22810b0fa3.. |
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000000038aadc3d77ae6df320e51168e6215f9abe62b65b51633715f719773bc (45 blocks) |
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000000038aadc3d77ae6df320e51168e6215f9abe62b65b51633715f719773bc |
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\end{quote} |
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\end{quote} |
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@ -769,6 +778,25 @@ The actual script used to disperse funds can be found here: |
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https://github.com/MyHush/hush3/blob/duke/contrib/snapshot/airdrop\_hush3.sh |
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https://github.com/MyHush/hush3/blob/duke/contrib/snapshot/airdrop\_hush3.sh |
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\nsection{Shielding Rule} |
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Previously Hush inherited the rule about shielding coinbase before sending to a |
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transparent address. Now that Hush is based on Komodo, this rule no longer |
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exists, which means mining pools can send newly mined coinbase funds directly to |
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pooled miners. |
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The rule was well-intentioned, but it did not result in real privacy |
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improvements, since 95\% of all ZEC is still in transparent addresses, and |
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people move amounts "throught" zaddrs (instead of keeping funds in them) in such |
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a way as to make transactions easy to link. |
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Hush will take the stance of educating users to the risks of transparent addresses, |
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constantly, and make shielded operations the default in all GUI wallets. |
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Additionally, since shielding is so fast now, and various service providers are |
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now supporting Sapling shielded addresses, we encourage users to hold funds in |
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Sapling zaddrs by default and only use transparent addresses when necessary, |
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such as exchanges that only support transparent addresses. |
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\nsection{Special Thanks} |
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\nsection{Special Thanks} |
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