bdb 6.X was released under the AGPL, which is incompatible with MIT-licensed
software (the result must be licensed under AGPL). bdb 5.X uses the same license
as bdb 4.8, and thus retains the same compatibility as in upstream Bitcoin.
Thanks to Luke-Jr for raising this issue.
These flags are potentially risky, because they require that the app explicitly
initialize stuff that it wouldn't otherwise need to initialize, and we don't
have time for the necessary review.
Now that BIP66 passed, OpenSSL is no longer directly part of the
consensus. What matters is that DER signatures are correctly parsed, and
secp256k1 crypto is implemented correctly (as well as the other
functions we use from OpenSSL, such as random number generation)
This means that effectively, using LibreSSL is not a larger risk than
using another version of OpenSSL.
Remove the specific check for LibreSSL.
Includes the still-relevant part of #6729: make sure CHECK_HEADER is
called using the right CXXFLAGS, not CFLAGS (as AC_LANG is c++).
Zcash Note:
This includes a code removal from d9add719519e2019b1f353d8d6832dcfc88ee850
that was omitted from 5a3913361d during
backporting of bitcoin/bitcoin#6501 to 0.11.* in bitcoin/bitcoin#6703
People seem to agree that dnsseed.* is a more intuitive address.
The original address was committed to beta1 as a result of a misunderstanding.
The DNS seeder service will be updated to coincide with at beta2 release.
Upstream patch: Fix and improve relay from whitelisted peers
https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/7106
a9f3d3db5c0c8d1697998ed9b3e192ddbf9a31f4
An extra commit modifies the log message string, otherwise there are are a number of commits that need be to backported to add methods e.g. GetDebugMessage. These commits modify the interface in consensus/validation.h so there are conflicts to be resolved. e.g.
9003c7c
a9ac95c
5f12263
fbf44e6
Since the parameters changed in z8, the benchmark on speed.z.cash is showing misleading results due to variability. (The quartile and extrema bars will still show the variability with 50 runs, they just won't jump around as much between benchmark data points.)
This makes sure that retransmits by a whitelisted peer also actually
result in a retransmit.
Further, this changes the logic to never relay in case we would assign
a DoS score, as we expect to get DoS banned ourselves as a result.
The setAskFor duplicate elimination was too eager and removed entries
when we still had no getdata response, allowing the peer to keep
INVing and not responding.
mapAlreadyAskedFor does not keep track of which peer has a request queued for a
particular tx. As a result, a peer can blind a node to a tx indefinitely by
sending many invs for the same tx, and then never replying to getdatas for it.
Each inv received will be placed 2 minutes farther back in mapAlreadyAskedFor,
so a short message containing 10 invs would render that tx unavailable for 20
minutes.
This is fixed by disallowing a peer from having more than one entry for a
particular inv in mapAlreadyAskedFor at a time.
Jack Grigg