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# HushDEX |
# HushDEX |
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HushDEX forked from the Subatomic Decentralized App (dapp) and we focus purely |
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on privacy coin swaps, and specifically, shielded swaps between Zcash Protocol |
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coins. These are called z-swaps. |
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## Z-swap example |
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Alice has 1 ZEC and wants to trade it for 5 HUSH, since she hears HushChat is |
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pretty awesome and ZEC just goes down in price, always. We represent this in |
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a diagram like this |
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Alice (ZEC) <> Bob (HUSH) |
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HushDEX is only concerns with Sapling shielded addresses (zaddrs) which start |
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with `zs1`. Even though ZEC supports Sprout addresses (which start with `zc`), |
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they cannot be used on HushDEX. Sprout is unsupported on HushDEX. |
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So Alice must make sure her ZEC is in a Sapling zaddr, and then she can use |
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HushDEX on her computer, to z-swap with Bob, in a decentralized way, with |
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no centralized service. The system is not completely trustless, users must |
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trust the developers and miners on the relevant chains to not do nefarious |
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things. There is no central authority to decide who gets to do what, it's |
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peer-to-peer like BitTorrent or Tor. |
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## Privacy Features of Z-Swaps |
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* No KYC |
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* We will not feed the identity theft industry any more free data |
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* No IP address limiting |
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* It is trivial to pay for an IP address from any country in the world |
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* Alice's address never appears in public data |
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* Bob's address never appears in public data |
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* Consequently, Alice and Bob's address cannot be searched for on an explorer |
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* Since you can't see the address of any transaction, you cannot infer if |
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the same address appears as sender or receiver in many transactions. |
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* The amount of the transaction, how much ZEC and how much HUSH, is unknown |
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* It could be pennies or millions |
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* The exchange rate of the transaction never appears on the blockchain |
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* The exchange rate will be leaked to the network p2p layer, but it is never |
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recorded in blockchain history. If you are not there to record it, it is gone. |
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* Realistically, it's simple to run a malicious node which records all exchange rates |
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and so we assume an adversary does this |
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* Since the exchange rate of ZEC/HUSH is already public data, this is not considered valuable |
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information leakage. We are leaking the differential of CEX ZEC/HUSH exchange ratio to |
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this DEX's ratio. |
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* Adversaries watching all possible public data can infer exchange ratios but no amounts |
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or addresses, which is considered a massive blow against blockchain analysis. |
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